My Philosophy

[desiresjab]

Let's assume the beginning of the universe gave rise to 1,000,000^1,000,000 particles, and that may be conservative;

That sounds like a gigantic overestimation, really. What kind of particles are you talking about? Presently the high end estimate for particles in the observable universe is 10^82. I realize you did not say observable. Still, I don't know how one gets from 10^82 to 1,000,000^1,000,000 for a universe with a diameter of 46 billion light years. Homegeneity would demand a much smaller number, unless you are talking about sub atomic particles--quarks, leptons, etc. I still think it would be a smaller number than a million to the millionth power.

[MorpheusSandman]

unless you are talking about sub atomic particles--quarks, leptons, etc. I still think it would be a smaller number than a million to the millionth power.

I was, and perhaps you're right about the overestimate; but one thing to consider is that particles are constantly popping in and out of existence as well, so the total number is not fixed. I not only had in mind those that exist in a fixed state, but those that have existed and disappeared as quickly. Probably impossible to estimate. Anyway, the actual number isn't all that important to the point.

[desiresjab]

I not only had in mind those that exist in a fixed state, but those that have existed and disappeared as quickly.

Hmm...those fireflies could add up all right, but their weak identities and sheer numbers dazzle me. For your conception of particles in this case, you may have erred on the conservative side.

Interestingly, the number of permutations (individual orders) of a fifty-two card deck of cards weighs in at around 10^70, and ought to easily the fill the Grand Canyon top to bottom, end to end with grains of average earth beach sand. It's a runaway.

Below is the actual number of orders of our deck of cards.

80658175170943878571660636856403766975289505440883 277824000000000000

Widely more than an octillion octillions, just in a deck of cards.

In a well randomized deck of cards it is not very likely that particluar arrangement has ever been shuffled up in earth's history.

That was my minor interjection and irrelevancy.

[YesNo]

But, again, there's a difference between deriving/explaining SWE and using SWE. Go back to my examples of aliens modeling how a car works VS explaining how it works. SWE models how the wavefunction behaves; MW interprets what SWE says, it just doesn't explain it as Born does. So you should rephrase your "MW doesn't need SWE" to "MW doesn't need TO EXPLAIN SWE." There's a difference. MW needs SWE since that's what it's interpreting.

As I understand it, Born interprets the norm of the coefficients of the SWE as probabilities. Those coefficients are complex numbers, but if you multiply them by their conjugates you get a real number. That product is what I'm calling the norm of the coefficients (maybe there's a better term). Whatever the name for this product is, this converts the "probability amplitude" to a probability for that event. Finally, if you sum all of these probabilities, you get 1. This is what you would expect if they were probabilities. Then one checks experimentally that this is the distribution of events. I think that is all the Born assumption is that the norm of the coefficients is the probability of the event occurring if it is measured.

I don't understand how MW interprets these coefficients, but it seems that Born's interpretation works experimentally, so why reject it?

Of these, only 2. is an actual problem. Hanson's "mangled words" MAY explain why the probabilities in the world we experience isn't uniform, but, again, we have no way to currently test it experimentally. It's just a possibility (one amongst many).

1) Because we are a quantum system ourselves; we decohere along with whatever other system we become entangled with. When we decohere, we subjectively find ourselves in one world. In a sense, one can look at our uncertainty prior to decisions/results as a kind of metaphorical superposition (they made a joke about this on The Big Bang Theory not too long ago: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HCOE__N6v4o). Anyway, asking why we wouldn't experience multiple worlds is a bit asking why we can't be in two places at the same time. It's a similar principle. If one world goes left and another goes right, we can't very well can't go right and left simultaneously, can we? The closest we can get is pondering whether to go right or left before we go left in one world and right in another.

Are you implying that we can't be in two places at one time? I thought the current MW position was saying we were in many places at one time. We must be experiencing ourselves in those other worlds like we are in this world.

Bohm and Hiley describes Everett's original version as a many minds rather than a many worlds position. Basically, the worlds didn't physically split, but our minds split and we only remember one of these splits. They claim this requires other assumptions about mind that have not been verified making MW rejection of the Born assumption nothing more than a replacement of one assumption with other assumptions that cannot be verified. And there goes the Occam's Razor argument that MW claims is in its favor.

3) Our "single world" is constantly decohering. Even if a single particle decoheres and becomes fixed in one world that doesn't meant there aren't countless others still in superposition, or even that that particle can't be in superposition again. For particles to stop being in superposition and stop decohering would essentially be for them to stop existing at all. They only seem to stop being in superposition and stop decohering when we observe them because we've become entangled with them. That's two quantum systems entangling out of a near infinity of possible quantum systems that can become entangled.

If the particle can go back into superposition (which it seems to do), why can't we experience those other worlds we were in before decohering the first time? My suspicion is that MW doesn't remove uncertainty and so what is the point of it?

This a simple scenario about spin that I don't understand how MW interprets. Suppose we measure the spin of a particle in direction X and get a result, say -1. At this point we don't know what the spin would be in some other direction, call it direction Y, because the uncertainty principle says we can't know both of these at the same time. Those other potential results are still in superposition unlike the X direction which we now know. Then we measure the spin in direction Y and let us say we get the value 1. With that measurement the superposition Y decoheres. What about the spin in the original X direction? Is it still -1? No one knows. It is back in superposition. We have to measure it again. Rather than -1, it could now be 1.

How does having many worlds resolve this situation to make it deterministic?

What does all this have to do with the topic of this thread?

Philosofer123 seems to assume there is a mutually exclusive dichotomy between determinism and chance. If something is not deterministic then it must have a chance distribution, which must be a uniform distribution if we do not want to involve panpsychism of some sort. From there he gets a regress argument, which I admit works in his preferred metaphysics. My challenge is that his preferred metaphysics does not fit reality and one of the ways to argue that (there are others) is to reference quantum mechanics.

[MorpheusSandman]

As I understand it, Born interprets the norm of the coefficients of the SWE as probabilities.

Yes, but it comes back to the issue of whether probabilities are something that exist in reality or in the mind, and whether there's a difference between this on the macro or micro level. Going back to the old coin-flip example, if you add up the probabilities of the two sides it also comes out to 1; but is it REALLY 50/50 or is the 50/50 only generated by our inability to mentally calculate the deterministic forces involve that would make the result of any coinflip 100/0 rather than 50/50? The correct answer is the latter in the macro world, since applying General Relativity in the span of the flip and the landing would give you the right answer every time (the problem would be being able to do the calculations before the landing!). So, the question becomes whether Born is to SWE as the coin-flip is to us; is it expressing an ACTUAL probability or just showing that the SWE decoheres across worlds unequally.

Right now, there's no way to experimentally tell, but it's worth pointing out that Born itself is silent on the Copenhagen/MW issue. It just gives us a means to do calculations based on our experiences, which is compatible with both views.

I don't understand how MW interprets these coefficients, but it seems that Born's interpretation works experimentally, so why reject it?

Nobody is rejecting Born; as you say, it's needed experimentally. Right now MW DOESN'T interpret the coefficients as it has no means to. CI only interprets them by assuming a single world and that the Born probabilities are an objective part of that single world. The problem with this are all of the problems this creates between CI and macro physics that have yet to be solved. The question is whether CI's assumption that "gets Born" (the single world collapse) is justifiable.

I don't know how to explain it any simpler than that: CI "gets Born" by assuming a collapse into a single world; this collapse creates all the problems/paradoxes associated with CI that are currently unsolved. MW "doesn't get Born" by assuming the objectivity of the SWE, which gives no reason why decoherence would happen more often one way than another. So, again, "where does Born come from?" is THE problem for MW. It's one myself (and all other MW proponents) admit exists; but it's no worse than the problems that exist for CI. I'm not sure what about this you don't get...

Are you implying that we can't be in two places at one time? I thought the current MW position was saying we were in many places at one time.

This is just a language barrier thing: the "us" in the other worlds are not "us" in this world. Let's say I'm driving a car and am not sure whether to turn left or right. MW says in one world "I" turn right and in another "I" turn left, but the "me" that turns left is not the "me" that turns right, and neither are either the "me" that wasn't sure whether to turn right or left. The point is that the "me" that isn't sure whether to turn left or right can never experiencing having turned both left and right simultaneously. Subjectively, I experience turning left in one world and right in another.

Bohm and Hiley describes Everett's original version as a many minds rather than a many worlds position. Basically, the worlds didn't physically split, but our minds split and we only remember one of these splits. They claim this requires other assumptions about mind that have not been verified making MW rejection of the Born assumption nothing more than a replacement of one assumption with other assumptions that cannot be verified. And there goes the Occam's Razor argument that MW claims is in its favor.

Few things here:

1. There's no justification for assuming that the mind operates any differently from the world around it. In fact, this creates other problems since it still has the implications that nothing is happening in the world unless there is a mind to perceive it... so what was happening on the quantum level for all those billions of years before there were any intelligent minds?

2. MW doesn't reject Born; MW just can't explain where Born comes from.

3. Don't know what you mean about "there goes the Occam's Razor argument for MW." Occam's Razor will always be on MW's side since MW basic claim is that everything (including us) operates according to QM. This is demonstrably simpler than CI that has to assume a collapse or even the above many minds that assumes that mind is somehow distinct/different from everything else in the universe.

If the particle can go back into superposition (which it seems to do), why can't we experience those other worlds we were in before decohering the first time?

In a sense, we can. Going back to my above driving example, let's say you turn left. Even if you can't turn right AND left, you can go back to that same street and turn right the next time and see what it would've been like. So, in a sense, you have experienced both the "worlds" of having turned left and right. That said, because both events happened at different times having been separated by many subsequent decoherences, the experiences may be slightly different than they would've been the first time.

Here's another visual illustration: http://www.askamathematician.com/201...r-many-worlds/

Go down to "simplified example" right before the red/blue arrow diagrams. You can see how the different worlds intersect.

My suspicion is that MW doesn't remove uncertainty and so what is the point of it?

I've explained this about a billion times: it removes uncertainty on the OBJECTIVE level, but SUBJECTIVELY we will always experience uncertainty because we can never be in both worlds simultaneously. At each decoherence point we subjectively find ourselves in one world or the other, and this creates uncertainty TO US.

I don't know what you mean by "what is the point of it?" The "point of it" is that it seems to be right! The problems with CI are well-documented and seemingly unsolvable. MW removes those problems by saying "everything is QM." If everything is QM, that includes us, and if we are quantum systems than we'd experience uncertainty due to decoherence. Is it really so radical that how things objectively work are so different than how things seem to us subjectively? Subjectively it seems like we're walking on a flat Earth and the sun moves in the sky. Objectively the Earth is round and we're the ones moving. Does us not being able to "experience" a round and moving Earth mean that the Earth isn't round and isn't moving?

How does having many worlds resolve this situation to make it deterministic?

It says it's both, and that with our measurement we (along with the particle) decohere, so we get both results if we consider both "us"es measuring the particle in both worlds. This basically Schrodinger's Cat: when we open the door, we decohere along with the cat, and A(us) in A(world) sees A(cat) as dead and B(us) in B(world) sees B(cat) as alive. Perhaps you don't understand that upon measurmeent we decohere along with the particles? Decoherence is about two quantum systems interacting; we are a quantum system ourselves, so we decohere when we "measure" because "measurement" is a type of interaction. Before measurement we can only see the possible interactions and measure it to a certain extent (Heisenberg).

[dratsab]

I downloaded your PDF. I want to revisit this topic after I read it. I've written my own philosophical works, but I can't post them here yet ;/