# Reading > Philosophical Literature >  Free Will

## danah

Hello,
I just read this below paragraph, and I would be thankful if you explain it to me though example; what does it mean you're morally responsible even if you don't have free will? if someone is coerced to steal a car, how can he be morally responsible? 


Here's the quote:
"_Some philosophers do not believe that free will is required for moral responsibility. According to John Martin Fischer, human agents do not have free will, but they are still morally responsible for their choices and actions. In a nutshell, Fischer thinks that the kind of control needed for moral responsibility is weaker than the kind of control needed for free will. Furthermore, he thinks that the truth of causal determinism would preclude the kind of control needed for free will, but that it wouldnt preclude the kind of control needed for moral responsibility. See Fischer (1994). As this example shows, virtually every issue pertaining to free will is contested by various philosophers._"

Thanks

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## SentimentalSlop

To say that someone should be morally responsible even if they don't have free will strikes me as very strange. Without free will, that means we are slaves to our upbringing, environment, and DNA as human beings and that whatever decisions we make, they are merely products of those factors and not ones determined by our individual choices. The whole argument seems like bull**** to me and contradictory.

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## mal4mac

Is Fischer assuming the thief is coerced by anyone? That seems to muddy the issue!

Advocates of free will hold that you have a free choice about stealing the car. Determinists hold that your choice is entirely determined. If the determinists are correct, then the thief should still be held responsible for the theft, as fear of incarceration acts as a deterrent.

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## cafolini

> To say that someone should be morally responsible even if they don't have free will strikes me as very strange. Without free will, that means we are slaves to our upbringing, environment, and DNA as human beings and that whatever decisions we make, they are merely products of those factors and not ones determined by our individual choices. The whole argument seems like bull**** to me and contradictory.


You are not talking about free will here. You are talking about choice within a set of possible ones given to you by God.
God is like a multiple choice test in that sense. You learn and choose the best answer according to your ability. You are talking about responsibility, the ability to respond best. Your multiple choices get better with time as you honestly learn God's teachings, that is, learn you, learn God. You, like God, are that you are.
You are perfect. Play no games. There is the only way you can be an author as you develop.
and...nobody gets to the father except through me. ~ C A Cafolini

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## SentimentalSlop

I am talking about free will.

And please, please don't call me perfect. I am not even close. O, but how I wish to be.

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## Eman Resu

There no such thing as a free Will; my attorneys charged me nine hundred bucks to draw mine up.

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## Nick Capozzoli

Here's the quote:
"Some philosophers do not believe that free will is required for moral responsibility. *According to John Martin Fischer, human agents do not have free will, but they are still morally responsible for their choices and actions.* In a nutshell, Fischer thinks that the kind of control needed for moral responsibility is weaker than the kind of control needed for free will. Furthermore, he thinks that the truth of causal determinism would preclude the kind of control needed for free will, but that it wouldn’t preclude the kind of control needed for moral responsibility. See Fischer (1994). As this example shows, virtually every issue pertaining to free will is contested by various philosophers."

I guess this means that this Fischer fellow believes: 1) that no humans have "free will" and; 2) that we are nonetheless "morally responsible" for any and all of our "choices and actions." Thus he believes that we are morally responsible for _anything_ we decide and do, and the question of "free will" has no bearing on our "moral responsibility" for the simple reason that "free will" doesn't exist. 

OK. This argument seems neat but suffers from logical circularity and begs several questions. The act of choosing between possible options and selecting a specific course of actions does depend on "will" to make a choice. The exact degree to which the chooser's will is "free" is arguable. But insofar as "choice" is concerned, an agent must be allowed a "choice" between at least two possible courses of action in order for the agent to have any sort of "will." If there is no possibility to "choose" an action, there is no will at all. This describes the behavior of very simple organisms whose behavioral repertoire is limited to reflexive responses to environmental stimuli. _E.g_ most of the behaviors of viruses, bacteria, and most of the _phyla_ below the advanced cephalopod mulloscs and chordates.

As regards humans, it is clear that we have the ability to choose courses of action. Philosophers can and have argued about just how "free" our will is to make choices. But even those who have the most restrictive view of the "freedom" of our will acknowledge that we do have some ability to chose one course of action over another. 

"Moral Responsibility" for our choices is another matter altogether. Clearly, if we make a choice, regardless of how constrained our choices are (so long as we can choose between more than one course of action), we can be considered "responsible" for that choice, simply because we made it. The question then becomes what, exactly, is our "moral" responsibility for having made the choice?

I don't see that Fischer's formulation helps answer that question in an intellectually satisfying way. Morality invariably requires that we consider notions of "right or wrong" or "good or bad" behaviors. The right or wrong and good or bad (or their more graded distinctions, such as "better or worse") distinctions are based on some sort of agreed-upon code of moral behavior.

Just about all of the moral codes of behavior we have to date accept the idea that human beings are able to make behavioral choices, particularly to "decide" upon a "moral" course of action. Even if we agree that, say, one or another choice of action is "more moral" than another, most reasonable folk (including moral and ethical philosophers and jurists (both modern and historical) would be inclined to agree that "culpability" for "immoral behavior" decreases in proportion to the limitations of the "will" of the person who made the choice to act in such-and-such a way.

Just asserting, as Fischer seems to have done, that none of us has "free will" helps our understanding of morality or helps us, as a society, to deal with "immoral" behavior. 

Fischer's argument seems to ignore the fact that there are some humans who, due to serious psychiatric or neurological disease, are severely limited in their ability to make "moral" choices. They certainly lack entirely "free" will (compared to more "normal" folk) but they are not so constrained that they must act reflexively like, say, paramecia or flatworms. They can and do make "choices." If you want a literary reference to such moral behavior, I'd recommend reading _The Sound and the Fury_. 

While it is true that anyone who "makes a choice" can be held "responsible" for his behavior, any moral philosophy that fails to acknowledge that some humans, due to mental incapacity, should be judged differently from "normal" humans who make "immoral" behavioral choices. Fischer may well argue that none of us have "free will" and all of us are "responsible" for our behaviors. That's fine, but insofar as he fails to address the fact that some humans suffer from neurological pathology that limits their choices, I think that his argument breaks down as a practical moral philosophy.

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## cafolini

> I am talking about free will.
> 
> And please, please don't call me perfect. I am not even close. O, but how I wish to be.


If you wish it so much, you can pray that God make you more perfect so that you can tell us what God's next move is going to be. ROFLMAO

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## russellb

does it help to say that he rejects freewill viz a viz the doctrine of 'origination' but holds a 'compatablist' view whereby people may be held responsible for their actions?

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## YesNo

If I understand the arguments so far, I think I would agree with SentimentalSlop and Nick Capozolli. 

The "compatibilists" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism), like Fischer, are trying to rationalize the conflict between the evidence of our own social lives in which recognizing free will is necessary with a metaphysical belief system that everything is determined. I think that attempt fails. The best Fischer can do is assert what he is trying to prove as an assumption. If he thinks he is doing more than that his position is irrational.

The "incompatibilist" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incompatibilism) position does not accept that determinism and free will are compatible with each other. If determinism is true, we have no free will. If we have free will determinism is false. I would take the positon that free will is real, even if it is limited, and determinism is false. The evidence for that would come from our own lives and from quantum physics.

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## mal4mac

Just listened to the In Our Time on Free Will, again, voted one of the ten best programmes in that best of BBC radio programmes. Definitely worth a listen, in the context of this thread. 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00z5y9z

Galen Strawson pointed out that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics makes absolutely no difference to the argument against free will, and Simon Blackburn agreed with him. Strawson pointed out that it's still not certain that quantum mechanics is determinate, he leans to the idea that Einstein might have been right in declaring "God did not play dice". Blackburn pointed out that either way, Bohr or Einstein, doesn't impact on the argument against free will. Strawson agreed.
I agree with Strawson and Blackburn.

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## YesNo

There's an interesting chart in the Wikipedia article on the argument against free will: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standar...inst_free_will

The chart shows these four mutually exclusive options to pick from regarding free will and determinism:

A. *Hard Determinism*: no free will, physical determinism is true
B. *Compatibilism*: free will, physical determinism is true
C. *Hard Incompabitilism*: no free will, physical determinism is false
D. *Libertarianism*: free will, physical determimism is false
If one holds the metaphysics that we are machines rather than organisms, none of the four options are satisfactory and the problem of free will is difficult. The reason it is difficult is because there are few, if any, agents recognized by this metaphysics who are able to make a choice.

However, if we look at our own experiences as organisms with the ability to choose, unburdened by the machine metaphor, it is easy to see which of the four options is correct:

A. *Hard Determinism*: Unscientific, our personal experience falsifies it
B. *Compatibilism*: Irrational, because it claims contradictory things are true
C. *Hard Incompatibilism*: Unscientific for the same reason as A
D. *Libertarianism*: True
It makes one wonder how anyone could choose A, B or C, and yet they do. A lot of this has to do with their philosophical approaches to quantum physics. 

Those who choose A or B, don't believe that quantum indeterminism is real or maybe it will be overcome in the future. They can be dismissed as unscientific. They refuse to look at evidence.

Those who pick C, accept this indeterminism, but claim that what indeterminism implies is that "chance" or "randomness" is involved and a machine is not free just because there is randomness. Well, first of all, we are not machines. Second, quantum indeterminism is not "random" with a uniform distribution. The probabilities for different events to occur are not all the same. This non-random indeterminism doesn't help a machine get free will, but it does make this quantum indeterminism look more interesting, almost as if we could use an organism model even at the quantum level.

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## mal4mac

> Those who choose A or B, in some way don't believe that quantum indeterminism is real or maybe it will be overcome in some way. They can be dismissed as unscientific. They refuse to look at evidence.


There maybe "hidden variables" that determine quantum events. It may be that it only appears that things proceed in a merely probabilistically determinative way. In actuality, they proceed in an absolutely deterministic way. These matters continue to be subject to some dispute. (Notice I say "probabilistically determinative", which is more accurate than saying "indeterminate".) This is not being unscientific, keeping the options open in such a contentious area is being scientific.

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## YesNo

> There maybe "hidden variables" that determine quantum events. It may be that it only appears that things proceed in a merely probabilistically determinative way. In actuality, they proceed in an absolutely deterministic way. These matters continue to be subject to some dispute. (Notice I say "probabilistically determinative", which is more accurate than saying "indeterminate".) This is not being unscientific, keeping the options open in such a contentious area is being scientific.


I think the only way to get to determinism is through some form of many worlds, but if you have a link to some other alternative I would be interested in looking at it. The problem with many worlds is that it can't even derive the Born probabilities and so has an initial hurdle to overcome before it can even be considered.

It might be more useful to drop strict, absolute determinism altogether since it has failed at the quantum level, and look at science as a study of trends that are repetitive. The value in doing this is that we would no longer be conceptually boxed in by that constraint.

As far as the label "unscientific" goes, I don't mind calling these people "scientific" if you don't mind calling Young Earth Creationists "scientific" because they want to keep their options open as well. However, I don't think either will be shown by future science to be true, but who knows?

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## mal4mac

> As far as the label "unscientific" goes, I don't mind calling these people [determinists] "scientific" if you don't mind calling Young Earth Creationists "scientific" because they want to keep their options open as well. However, I don't think either will be shown by future science to be true, but who knows?


There is a mass of evidence against "Young Earth Creationism" - fossils, half-life,... but there is no mass of evidence for or against any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics.

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## YesNo

> There is a mass of evidence against "Young Earth Creationism" - fossils, half-life,... but there is no mass of evidence for or against any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics.


No problem. I will continue to use the label "unscientific" for people who insist on claiming that falsified statements are true. It is probably what I should do anyway.

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## mal4mac

> No problem. I will continue to use the label "unscientific" for people who insist on claiming that falsified statements are true. It is probably what I should do anyway.


But you say yourself that, "I think the only way to get to determinism is through some form of many worlds". So you admit that determinism is a possibility! It is unscientific to believe that any of these interpretations are "true". You might prefer one model, in certain circumstances, because it helps you do your calculations better. Or you might prefer another model because it seems "neater" or "hangs better". That is, your acceptance of a particular model is down to utility or taste, not because it is the best scientific model.

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## YesNo

> But you say yourself that, "I think the only way to get to determinism is through some form of many worlds". So you admit that determinism is a possibility! It is unscientific to believe that any of these interpretations are "true". You might prefer one model, in certain circumstances, because it helps you do your calculations better. Or you might prefer another model because it seems "neater" or "hangs better". That is, your acceptance of a particular model is down to utility or taste, not because it is the best scientific model.


What I understand now, after many discussions on Lit Net and going over the links and referenced books, is that many worlds is not even an interpretation of quantum physics. It cannot derive the Born probabilities. This is not a question of aesthetic preference or convenience. Many worlds isn't even one of the options to choose from.

Why do people say that many worlds interprets anything of value about quantum physics? That's the question that is on my mind. To maintain that something is an interpretation all the while admitting it is not an interpretation is to think irrationally. 

I remember reading that John Bell claimed that a superdeterminism is the only way out of the nonlocality of quantum reality: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism To prove our reality is superdeterministic would require proving that we are as deluded about who we are as people in a "Matrix" sort of universe. 

The only reason I can see for someone to want something like that is because they want to salvage an outdated metaphysical box that they are in. It is easier to just get out of the box. Science has falsified the deterministic metaphysics anyway. 

One doesn't have to accept that falsification, but doing that would make one "unscientific". In itself that is fine. One doesn't have to be scientific. However, if one claims one is nonetheless "scientific" even though one accepts a falsified theory, that challenges logical consistency and would mean one's thought processes are irrational. All that goes to show is how powerful metaphysics can be.

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## mal4mac

> ... Many worlds isn't even one of the options to choose from.


Sorry, you don't get to declare that, the physics community still feels it is a valid option. You can say *you* don't think it's a valid option, but that leaves you with having to work very hard to convince the physics community of your view.

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## YesNo

> Sorry, you don't get to declare that, the physics community still feels it is a valid option. You can say *you* don't think it's a valid option, but that leaves you with having to work very hard to convince the physics community of your view.


Well, that is all I'm claiming. 

All that exists are individuals who each make their own choices as to what interpretations each accept as valid. 

I've made my arguments why many worlds is not an interpretation of quantum physics. You can accept them or not, but invoking a bogus authority is not an argument for many worlds.

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## desiresjab

If consciousness arises out of the quantum world, and the inderterminancy of that world is somehow imparted without its randomness, there can be free will. Can there be indeterminancy without randomness? Is randoness actual, or a mere construct? We cannot mechanically reproduce it. That is why all programs and mechanical attempts to produce it are known as peuedo-random.

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## dratman

In everyday life, when we use the term "free will" we usually refer to a lack of constraint or coercion. For example, if someone says, "I came here of my own free will," it means that no one compelled the person to make the trip. There was no physical force used, nor was there any sort of threat made to the person's career, family or future-well being. Because of the lack of coercion, the person felt unconstrained, able to make a personal choice without fear of retribution.

i have heard a judge ask, "Did you enter into this agreement of your own free will?" The implication is the same as in the first example: no coercion of any kind was applied.

But if I ask myself, "Do I have free will?" I am not worrying about coercion or threat. Rather I am wondering whether I can really, inside myself, decide anything at all on my own -- in some deep sense. At the same time, I know in the ordinary way that I decide many things every day. On days when I cannot decide anything, I cannot do anything. But such days are rare. Usually I am making little decisions all the time.

So in discussing free will, it seems that we are not speaking about coercion, nor about our inherent ability to make decisions. So what then do we mean by "free will"? I don't think we really have any idea. But if we don't know what we are talking about, and cannot agree on what it is, can we really learn much by going on talking about it anyway? 

I do not think we can learn anything from such a discussion.

My favorite philosopher is Ludwig Wittgenstein.

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## YesNo

> But if I ask myself, "Do I have free will?" I am not worrying about coercion or threat. Rather I am wondering whether I can really, inside myself, decide anything at all on my own -- in some deep sense. At the same time, I know in the ordinary way that I decide many things every day. On days when I cannot decide anything, I cannot do anything. But such days are rare. Usually I am making little decisions all the time.
> 
> So in discussing free will, it seems that we are not speaking about coercion, nor about our inherent ability to make decisions. So what then do we mean by "free will"? I don't think we really have any idea. But if we don't know what we are talking about, and cannot agree on what it is, can we really learn much by going on talking about it anyway?


I agree with this. Free will is an intention to make a choice even if we agree to do what we seem coerced to do. A robot does not intend to do something. What gets done is determined by a program that the robot has to follow.

Well that's how I'm trying to define free will at the moment until it gets shot down. Then I'll make an intention and choose to fix it. Or not.

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## russellb

one way of explicating the meaning of 'free will' would be to talk of 'unimpeded will' or will free from impediment. We think of coercion in 'external' terms so to speak but could we think of 'internal' impediments that would prevent the will from being free? One thing that has come into my mind is the absence of knowledge. I cannot will an action like riding a bike unless I have acquired the procedural knowledge to allow me to do so. I think that this raises a further issue and that is, is free will a matter of degree or is it an absolute?

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## YesNo

To keep this going, I'll say that I think free will is a matter of degree. We have enough free will to make choices in many circumstances such as which words to type in a post. 

There are two sources of people who think we do not have free will: 

(1) Those who think _unconscious_ mechanisms determine everything such as quantum particles, selfish genes or neurons, and 

(2) those who think _conscious_ beings determine our behavior such as angels, gods, demons, other people, plants or animals.

In either case our free will has too many constraints on it for us to make any choice. Without denying the possible existence of either of these sets of constraints, I think we have enough free will to make choices.

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## desiresjab

Free Will or determinism will never be proved or disproved. Is the dealing machine at your local casino random? No, it is psuedo-random. No human can tell the difference on an empirical level. We have psuedo-free will. The complexity of reality makes it seem as if we have free will. Actually, that is good enough. Psuedo-free will allows what seem like (and may be) choices to intervene, allowing us a belief in our moral responsibility. Not a bad thing.

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## russellb

Isn't there a psychological aspect to the question in terms of a need to believe in free will? Is it what Nietzsche called a 'useful fiction' and is something that might have psychosocial justification if perhaps not a metaphysical basis so to speak? Or can we live 'Beyond Freedom and Dignity' to borrow the title of B F Skinner's book?

There is also an issue that has puzzled me although I have not delved into it very deeply and my thinking may be quite muddled. If we were to assume that the origins of language involve the construction of 'rough and ready tools' - excuse my imprecise metaphor - then how can a term such as 'freewill' precisely correspond to any definite type of 'object' (although obviously we would probably say a free agent is a 'subject'). If our understanding of the term 'free will' is necessarily imprecise - born of 'rough and ready' origins then can we ever actually get round to answering the existential question - is there such a thing as 'free will?' What lawyers do is stipulate definitions but surely that's not the path of philosophy...

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## YesNo

There is a book on causality by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum, "Causality: A Very Short Introduction", which discusses the issue of determinism through the idea of causality. I think the current philosophical preference is for something called "dispositionalism". It allows free will within limits.

How one approaches causality will affect how one understands free will.

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## desiresjab

Would some people have more free will than others? If it exists, is it necessarily a universal constant?

I call our free will ersatz free will. It looks and feels like the real thing. It is the real thing in our experience. Its limits are expressed in the form of counter forces. In the old days they called the counter force evil or the devil or temptation.

We always do what we want. Every single time our actions are under our own control. This does not apply to a man being led in handcuffs to prison. Even when we do something voluntarily that we hate, we must want to do it more than not doing it, or we would not decide to do it. One might hate mowing the lawn, but submits to the counter force of one's harping mate as the easier route--in other words a choice, though it is a hard choice, and what one, in the end, wants to do. If the counteforces were not strong there would be no concept of free will. Some choices only win by a small amount, others are runaway winners. Whatever their margins of victory, it is them that now enter the world of causation. One can also believe those choices that enter the world of causation were already in it via the chemical constituents that "help" us make decisions. Maybe, but at that point we are down to merely suspecting things. The limits of what are tradtionally called good and evil exist only in the opposite counter force. This model is only a huge abstraction that reduces everything to counter forces. Every decision is not clearcut. Because our wills have effects not only upon our own bodies but the sensibilities and actions of others, we consider with each decision much more than our hedonistic drives. Our will involves others. It always does. More factors come into play than we could possibly differentiate.

There is some idea in philosophy that if a will does not succumb each time to the hedonistic impulse over every other impulse, it must not be free. We do what we want each time. Hedonism turns out be only one stream of influence.

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## Michael T

It seems to me that whatever arguements you make for any form of free-will, they are destined to die wriggling on the barbed hook of determinism - and rightly so.

Nietzsche's phrase 'useful fiction' as mentioned by russellb above, or even 'necessary fiction' are as good as it gets for free-will.

It's surprising how many people find it difficult to let go of the concept of free-will. The arguements for it seem to be based more on a desperation for determinism not to be true, rather than the logical acceptance that whichever direction you take, you always end up back wriggling on that hook.

Accepting determinism doesn't really change anything, we just go on living our day-to-day lives as if free-will did exist and pay the consequences thus, but perhaps with a little more empathy.

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## YesNo

If we don't have free will why argue the point? We can't change. 

The whole free will debate puzzles me. If we really do not have free will, that is, if we are not agents to some extent, we shouldn't have this discussion. Computers don't argue about their free will. Zombies don't argue about their free will. 

Desiresjab admits, "It looks and feels like the real thing. It is the real thing in our experience." That should be enough for someone with a scientific, empiricist perspective to admit free will exists. Otherwise what is the point of empiricism if we don't trust our experience?

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## Michael T

> If we don't have free will why argue the point? We can't change. 
> 
> The whole free will debate puzzles me. * If we really do not have free will, that is, if we are not agents to some extent, we shouldn't have this discussion.* Computers don't argue about their free will. Zombies don't argue about their free will.


Ah, but if we don't have free-will then we don't really get a choice on whether we have the discussion about it or not do we!

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## YesNo

> Ah, but if we don't have free-will then we don't really get a choice on whether we have the discussion about it or not do we!


I'm trying to think of some smart-aleck response, but my batteries are running down and I may have to recharge them. Besides most of my programming occurs when my muse wakes me up in the middle of the night. She's the real agent and unfortunately a night person. 

When I explain the situation to her, the first thing she's going to ask is _What kind of non-agent are you?_ You do admit that you're a non-agent with no free will of any sort, right? If that assumption is still true, then are you a robot or are you a zombie? A robot (aka computer) is someone who's been programmed by a real agent, like my muse, with free will and an ability to assume responsibility. If you are a robot, that means she'll have to think before she programs me to give you an answer. A zombie is--well, you know--lights on nobody home. If you're a zombie my asking you this question is likely a waste of time.

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## Michael T

I suggest you dump that muse and find one that knows what they're talking about.

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## YesNo

I kind of like her. But the question I originally asked still stands. If you are not an agent, what are you?

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## Michael T

See below!

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## Michael T

> I kind of like her. But the question I originally asked still stands. If you are not an agent, what are you?


I'll try and keep it simple...

I'm a human organism whose whole existence, like the universe about him, is riding the wave of the 'present'. That continually moving 'present' is the culmination of all cause/effect from the beginning of the universe. My DNA, my thoughts, feelings, actions, bodily tics, sneezes, dream sequences, each bead of sweat that appears on my brow, each sigh I make, each blink, each utterance, each glance and each thought, every 'choice' I think I make, each feeling of fear or angst. All of these, as with each wave in the sea, each drifting and changing cloud in the sky, each and every butterfly and each flutter on the wing are nothing more than the culmination of these causes and effects acting-out, and as they act out so they too instantly become part of the chain of cause and effect and in turn exert their influence. That's it - there is nothing else, no 'ghost in the machine' and no escape into an infinite regression of 'ghosts'. Being human, the way we exist in the world and with others, makes this concept of 'lack of agency' difficult to come to terms with; it feels alien - because it's not how we experience being in the world.

Being good philosophers and scientists we have to overcome the disappointment we may personally feel as we accept the logic and science that lead us to this conclusion. However, there will always be those of a weaker mindset* that refuse to accept what we have come to understand; they will, of course, turn to religion, spiritualism, spurious 'quantum theory' arguement, and plain old gobbledygook rather than learn to let go, accept, and then carry on with life as if we do indeed have 'free will', as that is what our thinking selves and our societies are built on - a necessary illusion.

* Their arguements seem to derive not from philosophical rigor or science, but rather from a personal dislike, and unwillingness to accept the idea that we have no free will - in much the same way that religious folk cling to concepts of omnipotent beings that care for them personally. Some people can't cope with the idea that they are not 'special'.

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## YesNo

> I'll try and keep it simple...


Thanks for clarifying your position. 




> I'm a human organism whose whole existence, like the universe about him, is riding the wave of the 'present'. That continually moving 'present' is the culmination of all cause/effect from the beginning of the universe.


Before you jump to conclusions about causality, if you get a chance, look at Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum's "Causation: A Very Short Introduction". I keep bringing this book up and no one wants to discuss it. Perhaps you will find it interesting enough to consider alternate views.

They end with a position that is called "dispositionalism". Determinism is dismissed, but not without historical and philosophical arguments.




> My *DNA*, my thoughts, feelings, actions, bodily tics, sneezes, dream sequences, each bead of sweat that appears on my brow, each sigh I make, each blink, each utterance, each glance and each thought, every 'choice' I think I make, each feeling of fear or angst.


I was at the clinic for my annual wellness checkup this morning and noticed on the monitor in the waiting room the following bit of information that I copied:

_Your genes don't dictate your health. You do.
_
This seems to me to be good advice. I only mention it because I think you might be caught up in DNA determinism.




> All of these, as with each wave in the sea, each drifting and changing cloud in the sky, each and every butterfly and each flutter on the wing are nothing more than the culmination of these causes and effects acting-out, and as they act out so they too instantly become part of the chain of cause and effect and in turn exert their influence. That's it - there is nothing else, no 'ghost in the machine' and no escape into an infinite regression of 'ghosts'. Being human, the way we exist in the world and with others, makes this concept of 'lack of agency' difficult to come to terms with; it feels alien - because it's not how we experience being in the world.


Do you think Zeno was also right about motion? Is it an illusion like free will? Sure, we move our hands and feet, but that is only an illusion because if space is a mathematical line and time is a mathematical line then no motion actually happens.

I find it interesting that Zeno would rather be a metaphysician than a scientist. He believed in the mathematical line and so the evidence in front of his eyes contradicting his beliefs had to be rejected.




> Being good philosophers and scientists we have to overcome the disappointment we may personally feel as we accept the logic and science that lead us to this conclusion. However, there will always be those of a weaker mindset* that refuse to accept what we have come to understand; they will, of course, turn to religion, spiritualism, spurious 'quantum theory' arguement, and plain old gobbledygook rather than learn to let go, accept, and then carry on with life as if we do indeed have 'free will', as that is what our thinking selves and our societies are built on - a necessary illusion.


There are two ways to escape the indeterminism of quantum physics and recover determinism. One is to believe in some form of many worlds where every quantum choice splits the universe into copies of itself. This has many problems. It isn't coherent and it is a speculation that cannot be falsified since we cannot see those other worlds. The other, more coherent way, is to believe in "superdeterminism". It is very similar to what you are describing.

The problem with superdeterminism is that you cannot be a philosopher, good or bad, nor a scientist, good or bad, if it is true. The scientist cannot make a choice to perform an experiment and see what might happen. The philosopher cannot choose between alternate explanations of reality. All of these activities involve choices which require agency on the part of the one making a choice.




> * Their arguements seem to derive not from philosophical rigor or science, but rather from a personal dislike, and unwillingness to accept the idea that we have no free will - in much the same way that religious folk cling to concepts of omnipotent beings that care for them personally. Some people can't cope with the idea that they are not 'special'.


I don't have any religion to promote although I'll admit to being a generic panentheist. You can look up the term. 

The problem with determinism is the same as the problem with Zeno's motionless reality. To accept either of these positions one has to be anti-scientific because the scientific evidence in front of our faces falsifies both of those positions. All you have left is questionable metaphysics. 

I suppose you could call that "philosophical rigor". However, it is just as rigorous as any cult whatsoever believing in whatever nonsense they assume to be true and then claiming that those who disagree with them suffer from some "illusion" because they have "personal dislikes" or they have an "unwillingness to accept the idea" of something or other that the evidence in front of their faces falsifies.

Edit: 

It occurred on waking up this morning that you may be a member of a cult or under a cultural spell of some sort. I just want to point out the following that makes me suspicious:

1) There is the statement of belief in the first paragraph. That's fine. You can believe anything you want.

2) Rather than justifying that belief in a rational manner with scientific evidence, psychological claims are made against people who might disagree by using phrases such as "those of a weaker mindset", those who have "a personal dislike", those who have an "unwillingness to accept" your idea, or those who believe in "plain old gobbledygook rather than learn to let go". It seems you are more interested in establishing an us-them relationship with some enemy more than you are interested in establishing any evidence for your belief.

3) Actual science that would discredit the belief statements is dismissed without argument by the phrase "spurious 'quantum theory' arguement". 

4) The alleged superiority of those holding the belief is asserted by claiming they are "good philosophers and scientists". Since you are not accepting quantum physics the position sounds pseudo-scientific, that is, it wants to claim the legitimacy of science while rejecting scientific evidence.

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## cannotsleep

He was wrong, his deviation from human behaviour, humanities and human upbringing is a dead throwaway. You'll think of multiple deconstructive questions that breaks the logic behind it, above are a bunch of philosophical constituted subjects that looks into different personalities. Armchair theory again, boring perspective, pessimistic attitude. This is like someone telling you how your life is supposed to be. He isn't the one who tells me what I am responsible for, he doesn't acquire my field, my abilities or my experience. I haven't read any of his articles though, so it's safe to assume that the context I don't have was supposed to contribute the the above. It pushes into living, being and entity, into a philosophical proximate medium for jerk.

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## cannotsleep

After considering what he typed. I'm going to say that this guy deviates from humanities, and has equal of antisocial awareness which still fails to understand the situation of modern society. That's all.

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## Michael T

@ - *YesNo* & *mal4mac*...


You might find this short introductory undergraduate lecture on 'Free Will' from Oxford University (You Tube) helpful and informative. There are four parts to the lecture and they range from 10-20 minutes each. The short four sections follow on from each other automatically. (7.1 - 7.4) I think you'll find it's worth the effort to watch all four parts.



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XT6DKn6ZJso

I hope you enjoy them, and look forward to hearing what you think.  :Smile5:

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## YesNo

I watched the four Millican talks. He provided a review of some ideas associated with free will and mentioned Robert Kane, a libertarian, whom I have not read, but I plan to read later.

There are some ideas that came up that interested me: 1) determinism, 2) randomness, 3) choice and 4) intentional agency. The first two, determinism and randomness are usually believed to be ways for changes to occur without the need to have an agent intending and then performing the change. The last two, choice and intention, clearly require an agent.

The first thing I would question is the very existence of determinism as a cause that does not need an agent. Millican referenced Hume as pointing out that we don't really know what cause means except that we see things happen as a conjunction and intuit that one thing causes the other thing. The book by Mumford and Anjum that I mentioned earlier in the thread goes into Hume's argument in more detail, but for now I'll use Hume's argument to suggest that we really do not know that an agent at some level was not responsible for what we label as a deterministic cause. 

The second thing I would suggest is that the same argument would apply for randomness.

However, we could still retain the ideas of determinism and randomness as something not requiring an agent for theoretical purposes in the same way that we look at philosophical zombies. Such zombies are human organisms without intentionality. These zombies do not exist, but they are useful when we want to contrast how they would behave with the way real humans behave. 

Millican says it is important to come up with a definition of "choice". I would suggest that a choice occurs if one can rule out determinism and randomness as the complete cause. 

When someone says we have free will, they do not mean that we have absolute free will, only that we can make a responsible choice after all the determinism and randomness has been accounted for. Also we just have to perform one intentional act in our entire lifetimes for that condition to be satisfied. Those who claim we have no free will claim we cannot perform even that one act. 

I will stop there. 

How does your position on not having free will fit in with what Millican had to say?


Edit:

I had a chance this morning to listen to a lecture by Robert Kane which is relevant to human free will: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rtceGVXgH8s Anyone who says we do not have free will will have to address Kane's position.

I am also interested in the possibility of free will outside the human species and even outside any species. This is where I find quantum physics interesting. We need to add something to the results of a quantum experiment besides determinism and randomness since neither completely explain the outcome of the experiment and there are no hidden variables. That is where I would assign free will, or choice, although it is not the same sort of free will and choice as the human choosing to perform the experiment has. Why bother doing this? It would be one way to justify the views of panpsychism which Thomas Nagel has promoted.

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## desiresjab

In determinism a man is never free of his past. 

The categorical thinking of the old masters is passe and stiff.

Free will is a relative claim, formally a matter of definitions.

The only totally free being would be the one children are taught, who has no limitation whatsoever.

On the Bell curve of relative freedom of will, man falls somewhere. One guess is as good as the next.

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## YesNo

> Free will is a relative claim, formally a matter of definitions.


I agree that it is relative or comes in degrees. All I am claiming is that it exists.

I've been looking at videos of Robert Kane recently who is an incompatiblist (libertarian). That is he does not believe free will is compatible with complete determinism, a position I support as well. Here's a video that summarizes his view: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A61X-5b847U

His definitions of "self forming actions" and "ultimate responsibility" may have resolved the logical problems some have justifying our common sense notion of free will and responsibility. At least from my perspective, those issues are resolved. He also emphasizes free will over free action and finds a physical ground for free will in our ability to do parallel processing in the brain allowing us to have alternatives from which to pick.

At the end of the video he describes the movement of our lives as similar to character development in a novel that we create through our choices.

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## caddy_caddy

After reading this I changed my mind abt the free will"
"This trend began even before the work of psychologists such as Benjamin Libet, who showed that the conscious feeling of willing an act actually occurs after the brain process that brings about the act"
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/op...=fb-share&_r=0
with this fact arises the need for an external system " moral , metaphysical ,.." to follow and to be hold responsible according to it

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## YesNo

> After reading this I changed my mind abt the free will"
> "This trend began even before the work of psychologists such as Benjamin Libet, who showed that the conscious feeling of willing an act actually occurs after the brain process that brings about the act"
> http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/op...=fb-share&_r=0
> with this fact arises the need for an external system " moral , metaphysical ,.." to follow and to be hold responsible according to it


I agree with the two mistakes that were attributed to Descartes: (1) "...our knowledge of our mind's nature is more reliable than any other belief" and (2) "...his denial that other animals have any mental lives at all."

I don't think that leads to a total lack of free will, but our free will is part of a larger will. I wonder if that is what you are suggesting with the "need for an external system". 

Here is an overview of Libet and his experiment: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet

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## caddy_caddy

Yes, another point of reference, call it a larger will or another will .Moreover,this justifies the existence of the divine will.The article says that there is no first point of view and that we" read "ourselves not know ourselves.Maybe our brain "reads"our destiny .

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## YesNo

I think part of Libet's experiements show there is a larger will as you mention. If one couples them with evidence from psi research (see Dean Radin) it looks like we are part of something larger that is conscious and not unconscious.

There are two positions about free will that I think are incorrect:

1) The view that we are determined by unconscious, materialistic causes seems wrong. 

2) The view that we have free will as individuals seems wrong. When we exercise free will we do so in a shared way with other parts of reality that are also conscious and which influence our choices, but do not determine them.

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## Magnocrat

A mind boggling thread but very fascinating.
'Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and saint, and heard great argument
About it and about**: but evermore came out
By the same door as in I went.'

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