# Reading > Philosophical Literature >  the big bang theory~ how did we get here?

## cacian

how did we get here?

was it
a) by a single detonator as big as a bang
or
b) was it an alien portal extra terrestrial and humans intermixing to land a hand on landing here on earth?
or 
c) was it by god 's power and the garden of eden syndrome ?

please share your thoughts on the bigbang theory or others you may have in mind  :Smile:

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## MorpheusSandman

Um... what? Are you asking what happened before the big bang? If so, nobody really knows, but this is a good place to start. I'd forget about all the alien/god nonsense.

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## Lokasenna

'Um... what?' indeed. I fear this may go the way of the evolution thread...

The Big Bang theory is by far and away the prevailing scientific explanation for how the universe began - and whilst we're not exactly sure how it happened, we have managed to simulate what was going on very shortly thereafter.

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## cacian

> Um... what? Are you asking what happened before the big bang? If so, nobody really knows, but this is a good place to start. I'd forget about all the alien/god nonsense.


yes I am asking how humans got here and thank you for the links. somehow I like to think we got here in a different way completely and no one had a hand on it but us humans. how? I am unsure I guess the imagination wilds  :Smile: 




> 'Um... what?' indeed. I fear this may go the way of the evolution thread...
> 
> The Big Bang theory is by far and away the prevailing scientific explanation for how the universe began - and whilst we're not exactly sure how it happened, we have managed to simulate what was going on very shortly thereafter.


indeed and I can see what you mean going the evolution way but have no fear it is all about understanding each other and coping with amounts of information given to us and making some kind of sense of it.
the big bang seems ideal but somehow it is lacking in depth others. it is not clear is the issue.

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## MorpheusSandman

> yes I am asking how humans got here and thank you for the links. somehow I like to think we got here in a different way completely and no one had a hand on it but us humans. how? I am unsure I guess the imagination wilds


Well, asking how humans got here and asking how the universe got here are two very different questions. Asking how humans got here is evolution, asking how life got here is abiogenisis, and asking how the universe got here is cosmology.

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## cafolini

It's simply that some people got banged by retarded Eisntein and Roman Catholic contractor Hawkings trying to fabricate a new genesis for the birds. They tried to bang the chair of mathematics at Cambridge. They, of course, only banged themselves, cosmicomically.

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## MorpheusSandman

> retarded Eisntein


Are you just trolling?

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## cafolini

> Are you just trolling?


Yes, if you say so. You are Einstenian enough to figure it out. ROFLMAO!

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## cacian

> Well, asking how humans got here and asking how the universe got here are two very different questions. Asking how humans got here is evolution, asking how life got here is abiogenisis, and asking how the universe got here is cosmology.


sure but there is a succession of thoughts in that the cosmos/universe came into being because we were about to be if you see what I mean. humans and the universe are one interchangeable.
evolution if one is an evolutionist has to ask how life came into being before even remotely considering it and so without the universe life would not be.
I am an evolutionist by the way  :Smile:

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## Scheherazade

I use BT WiFi to get here.

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## Ecurb

I can't help but be here. It's annoying. No matter where I go, I'm always here. Just once, I'd like to be elsewhere.

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## cacian

> I use BT WiFi to get here.


ah do you? I use absolutely nothing and I am here i call it a stroke of luck lol  :Wink: 




> I can't help but be here. It's annoying. No matter where I go, I'm always here. Just once, I'd like to be elsewhere.


being here is where it is at. elsewhere is nowhere in my books. how is that you are annoyed ? every opportunity is an opportunity Ecurb you must know that you of all people haha  :Wink:

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## cafolini

> I can't help but be here. It's annoying. No matter where I go, I'm always here. Just once, I'd like to be elsewhere.


Cacianate Zolpidem is hard to find. Never here or anywhere she might claim. Hypnotic. Probably 20 mg.

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## cacian

> Cacianate Zolpidem is hard to find. Never here or anywhere she might claim. Hypnotic. Probably 20 mg.


LOL zolpidem did you say?? that sounds powerful.

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## Melanie

> I can't help but be here. It's annoying. No matter where I go, I'm always here. Just once, I'd like to be elsewhere.


Oh, you will be. But that's for another thread.

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## MorpheusSandman

> sure but there is a succession of thoughts in that the cosmos/universe came into being because we were about to be if you see what I mean. humans and the universe are one interchangeable.


LOL No. The universe was here long before humans and will continue to be here long after humans. We are only one of the universe's great many farts. No more or less important than anything else that happens out there. 




> evolution if one is an evolutionist has to ask how life came into being before even remotely considering it and so without the universe life would not be.
> I am an evolutionist by the way


LOL no. Evolution doesn't have to ask how life came into being because evolution only exists to address why life changes as it does. Abiogenisis addresses how life came into being, and there are many, many viable theories (one problem is our inability to know/replicate earth's environment from millions of years ago in order to test and see if life could arise in such an environment).

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## cacian

How interesting Morpheus because I see the universe and humans as one meaning one would not be without the other.
obviously if it was not for the universe humans would not be around they could not and therefore the opposite would apply logically.
for the universe to just be just does not correlate because for something to be it has to have a reason. everything has a reason. I tend to go with this feeling.  :Smile: 
and for this reason I would say humans are responsible for the makeup and the origin of the universe. humans came first and because they needed somewhere to camp so to speak set up the background that is the universe.
a bit like saying a painter would set up its background in order to convey an image without the background there is no image. 
a layout is the universe and humans are its image. humans reflect themselves through their background which is the planet otherwise they could not be.
for humans to be the universe must be and for it to be humans are it is two way situation.
that is of course how I interpret life in general of course I consider what you are saying and respect your views on the matter.  :Smile:

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## mal4mac

> sure but there is a succession of thoughts in that the cosmos/universe came into being because we were about to be if you see what I mean. humans and the universe are one interchangeable.


So are you a believer in the Strong Anthropic principle?

"The Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it."

and/or the PAP?:

"Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle




> how did we get here?


I'm a great believer in SPAP, because it amuses me more than the other guesses. So this question cannot be asked in my universe. In SPAP, being here is fundamental, no use asking "how did we get here?"

Note my even more fundamental axioms... (i) adopt the most amusing scientific guess as your first principle... (ii) amusement is truth... Keats was almost right...

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## YesNo

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle


Very informative link, mal4mac. You mentioned SPAP, but I must have missed it in the link. What does it refer to?

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## cacian

> So are you a believer in the Strong Anthropic principle?
> 
> "The Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it."
> 
> and/or the PAP?:
> 
> "Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being."
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle


Hi mal4mac and thank you for posting.
it is interesting this theory but it is not quite what I am trying to say.
Anthropic is suggesting that life and the universe are compatible meaning they must have happened one after the other and one happened to match the other. ie like the perfect coincidence which I believe is not the case. 
what I am trying to suggest is that one needs the other and that both happened at the same time or consecutively. life happened as the universe revolved around it at the same time. both are like a revolving door one does not turn without the other and vice versa.
the issue with anthropic is that it suggests that even if life is not about the universe carries on.
but with this theory the opposite effect does not apply ie life without the universe carries which cannot be the case. it is an impossibility.
In my theory/speculations I leaves no room for such error and so I suggest that life and the universe consequently revolved around each other. life is the activator the reason for the universe comes to be . it is like saying out of life is born a universe.
a great simile to it would be to compare it to a mother with a child. a child is born out of a mother and since we know that a child does not return to the womb to be born again, but continues in the same path ie reproduce more life, then the universe could not return to a state of vegetation either. what it does is go on expanding and adjusting according to life that takes place in and around it.
life is the universe and the universe is life. one cannot dissociate one from the other. 
the same way one cannot dissociate a mother from a child they are related no matter what. 

so we could describe the make up of the universe life it as a chain reaction:
life/ universe /life /universe /
the same would apply to:
mother /child/ then child to mother and then child and so on. it is the cycle of life.
life is the predictor of the universe and the universe is the predictor of life.
I prefer this sequence it is something that is observed in life our natural human life.

haha I hope this is not too confusing  :Smile:

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## mal4mac

> Very informative link, mal4mac. You mentioned SPAP, but I must have missed it in the link. What does it refer to?


I liked both the S & P anthropic principles so I just banged them together! Actually, I guess P is what counts, so maybe we should just stick with PAP... that acronym is rather a hostage to "normal" scientists though  :Smile: 




> Hi mal4mac and thank you for posting.
> it is interesting this theory but it is not quite what I am trying to say.
> Anthropic is suggesting that life and the universe are compatible meaning they must have happened one after the other and one happened to match the other.


Look carefully at the different variations, I think what you are thinking of is the most boring version, the aptly called "Weak Anthropic Principle". Look at the interesting PAP, I think it is saying what you are saying

"Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being."
Barrow and Tipler believe that this is a valid conclusion from quantum mechanics, as John Archibald Wheeler has suggested... and called the Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP).

These are three big names in physics, especially Wheeler, Feynman's mentor, ...





> what I am trying to suggest is that one needs the other and that both happened at the same time or consecutively. life happened as the universe revolved around it at the same time. both are like a revolving door one does not turn without the other and vice versa.


I think that's PAP, and certainly not pap  :Smile: 




> the issue with anthropic is that it suggests that even if life is not about the universe carries on.
> but with this theory the opposite effect does not apply ie life without the universe carries which cannot be the case. it is an impossibility.


No PAP requires the observer, the universe would not just go on without the observer (P is for participation...)




> In my theory/speculations I leaves no room for such error and so I suggest that life and the universe consequently revolved around each other. life is the activator the reason for the universe comes to be . it is like saying out of life is born a universe.


Sorry, it's Wheeler's theory, he got there first  :Smile:  Good independent speculation though, he's good company... his autobiography is superb ("Space-time foam and geons" I think it's called...) He's a funny man, like Feynman, definitely both stars in my cosmicomics universe.




> a great simile to it would be to compare it to a mother with a child. a child is born out of a mother and since we know that a child does not return to the womb to be born again, but continues in the same path ie reproduce more life, then the universe could not return to a state of vegetation either. what it does is go on expanding and adjusting according to life that takes place in and around it.


Great simile, well put, you should write a book about PAP, physicists write mostly pap when they popularise, you should do it for them...




> haha I hope this is not too confusing


Not as confusing as most popular physics books... not confusing at all really...

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## YesNo

> I liked both the S & P anthropic principles so I just banged them together! Actually, I guess P is what counts, so maybe we should just stick with PAP... that acronym is rather a hostage to "normal" scientists though


I did find PAP to be the more interesting of the Anthropic Principles in the article.

Recently I read Rupert Sheldrake's "The Science Delusion" and it introduced me to the idea of "morphic fields" as a way to reintroduce purpose into science as well as an older "cosmic egg" idea. I don't see how any universe given Brandon Carter's original Strong Anthropic Principle with multiverse could have ever got started.

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## mal4mac

But how does the observer evolve to do the observing? It can't, it must just be there, a "something" beyond the physical. But the only "something beyond the physical" that I'm certain of is me. So I must have created the universe! Just by observing. Good days work! Where's my bonus...

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## YesNo

I think "observing" is underrating the human activity. It is more like "observing with an intention or purpose of understanding", a purposeful observing. The anthropic principle should not just claim because we have observers we need a universe capable of allowing an observer to exist, but because we have purposeful observers we need a universe that allows purpose.

The way Sheldrake explained his "morphic field", it allowed purpose to all organized structures even atoms. Eventually the universe gets to us and we participate in the field of purpose (and memory, language, etc), but it has to have been doing something like that all along in order to get to us at all.

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## mal4mac

> I think "observing" is underrating the human activity. It is more like "observing with an intention or purpose of understanding", a purposeful observing.


I don't see that, my first act of observation must have brought the universe into being... me hearing a heart beat in the womb might have been the first act of creation/observation*. So there wasn't really a purposeful observing there, was there? It looks like very passive observing to me.

PAP doesn't suggest the universe is purposeful. Why should it be? 

I'm not sure about Sheldrake's "eventually the universe gets to us". No, in PAP, the observer is there first, there's "no eventually getting to us".

I am now starting to doubt that I was the creator/observer... a bit solipsistic maybe... Maybe the first conscious ape, call him "the PAP link", was the creator, and passed on his consciousness to all of us. Yes I like that better... I like to think that other people aren't just unconscious robots!

The PAP link hypothesis (PAPL) also explains why "there's no one out there", why with 10 thousand billion billion stars in the universe there are no aliens that have visited us from any of them! It's because there was only one observer who created the universe... our conscious fore-father... 

* now I understand that baby in space scene from 2001!

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## cacian

hi mla4mac 



> * now I understand that baby in space scene from 2001!


which scene is this?

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## YesNo

> I don't see that, my first act of observation must have brought the universe into being... me hearing a heart beat in the womb might have been the first act of creation/observation*. So there wasn't really a purposeful observing there, was there? It looks like very passive observing to me.


It may seem passive, but if there is some choice involved, such as should one move one's mouth or not, there would be purpose which would be the reason to make one choice over the other. 

Although it doesn't even seem conscious, the atom may be considered to be purposeful as well. It is more of a process than a thing and the next position of the electron is something it would have to choose.




> PAP doesn't suggest the universe is purposeful. Why should it be?


The reason to think it is purposeful is because we behave with purpose. That is, when we observe, we have goals whether it is where to get the next meal or why the universe works the way it does. Although PAP doesn't require purpose, we act with purpose, so an anthropic principal needs to provide a universe where purpose can occur. What better way than to have purpose from the very beginning with the simplest structures?




> I'm not sure about Sheldrake's "eventually the universe gets to us". No, in PAP, the observer is there first, there's "no eventually getting to us".


I don't think Sheldrake accepts PAP. I was just providing him as another alternative.




> I am now starting to doubt that I was the creator/observer... a bit solipsistic maybe... Maybe the first conscious ape, call him "the PAP link", was the creator, and passed on his consciousness to all of us. Yes I like that better... I like to think that other people aren't just unconscious robots!


Or a hydrogen atom. The "consciousness" is a bit odd, but the uncertainty allows for choice.




> The PAP link hypothesis (PAPL) also explains why "there's no one out there", why with 10 thousand billion billion stars in the universe there are no aliens that have visited us from any of them! It's because there was only one observer who created the universe... our conscious fore-father... 
> 
> * now I understand that baby in space scene from 2001!


I think there is other life out there, but I can see how PAP might not. I don't think they could reach us physically because the cosmic radiation would kill them if they tried.

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## mal4mac

> It may seem passive, but if there is some choice involved, such as should one move one's mouth or not, there would be purpose which would be the reason to make one choice over the other.


But this act of observation is the very first act, so how would there be "a choice" - that requires some mental activity before the first act, by definition impossible.




> The reason to think it is purposeful is because we behave with purpose. That is, when we observe, we have goals whether it is where to get the next meal or why the universe works the way it does. Although PAP doesn't require purpose, we act with purpose, so an anthropic principal needs to provide a universe where purpose can occur. What better way than to have purpose from the very beginning with the simplest structures?


Perhaps purpose could begin in the very first moment, but I don't see how you could get round observation preceding purpose.






> I think there is other life out there, but I can see how PAP might not. I don't think they could reach us physically because the cosmic radiation would kill them if they tried.


Surely an advanced civilisation could create reasonable radiation shields? We can already, just about, detect earth like planets already, so why haven't they detected us and sent us a signal? It's 13.7 billion year since the big bang, why aren't there thousands of civilisations millions of years older than ours moving around, or sending out signals, to say "hello" to us younger civilisation.

Where are they?!




> hi mla4mac 
> 
> which scene is this?


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6umxthz1Ys

And is this the "PAP link"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtbOmpTnyOc

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## cafolini

> But this act of observation is the very first act, so how would there be "a choice" - that requires some mental activity before the first act, by definition impossible.
> 
> 
> 
> Perhaps purpose could begin in the very first moment, but I don't see how you could get round observation preceding purpose.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Not even puzzling or intriguing. The mystery is net, solid, unsolvable. This is not Agatha's question with the answer already inside. May the Grace of God be with you.

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## mal4mac

> Not even puzzling or intriguing. The mystery is net, solid, unsolvable...


You don't find PAP intriguing? Fair enough, no one can say what you should find intriguing. I find it slightly intriguing, mildly amusing, something to jive around with in a thread for a few minutes. I don't know if 'origin of big bang' is unsolvable. What makes you say this? Someone said it was impossible to know what the stars were made of, then a few years later someone discovered spectroscopy.

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## cafolini

> You don't find PAP intriguing? Fair enough, no one can say what you should find intriguing. I find it slightly intriguing, mildly amusing, something to jive around with in a thread for a few minutes. I don't know if 'origin of big bang' is unsolvable. What makes you say this? Someone said it was impossible to know what the stars were made of, then a few years later someone discovered spectroscopy.


First of all, when you quote me, I'll appreciate your not being selective. Do the whole thing.
Secondly, you are talking about the evolution of science (assuming) and that might be intriguing or puzzling. But no matter how much science may evolve, and benefit us, it will never be sufficient to solve the mysterious aspect of the WHOLE. That mystery is unsolvable and you better take heed of that ultimate reality which we'll never control. May the Grace of God be with you in that genuine Mystery. Case closed.

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## mal4mac

> But no matter how much science may evolve, and benefit us, it will never be sufficient to solve the mysterious aspect of the WHOLE. That mystery is unsolvable...


Even if PAP is shown to be true I guess the question of why PAP is the way things work is still there. But maybe we can answer that, and maybe we can avoid an infinite regress. I don't see how, but maybe that's just my limitation. I think there might be a solution of why this WHOLE exists, than again, there might not be.

I've taken the liberty of not quoting you whole because It's clearer, at least to me, and I think to others, when responding to a particular point, not to repeat every other point you make.

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## MorpheusSandman

> You don't find PAP intriguing? Fair enough, no one can say what you should find intriguing. I find it slightly intriguing, mildly amusing, something to jive around with in a thread for a few minutes.


PAP is nonsense brought about by a fundamental misunderstanding of the observer role in quantum physics; every AP is nonsense except the weak one, and even it only amounts to a tautology. The rest just reveal what a strong anthropomorphic bias we have and how much we desperately want to think that everything exists for us. 




> I don't know if 'origin of big bang' is unsolvable.


It's not. See Krauss' A Universe from Nothing. Universes are an inevitable product of quantum fields, which seem to exist a part from those they create. 




> But no matter how much science may evolve, and benefit us, it will never be sufficient to solve the mysterious aspect of the WHOLE. That mystery is unsolvable and you better take heed of that ultimate reality which we'll never control. May the Grace of God be with you in that genuine Mystery. Case closed.


 :Rolleyes:  Every time in history someone has said "science will never..." science eventually has. I love how you call it an "unsolvable mystery" in one sentence and then not-so-subtly drop in your deity that man concocted to explain the "unsolvable mystery" (and which has utterly failed to where science has succeeded).

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## mal4mac

> PAP is nonsense brought about by a fundamental misunderstanding of the observer role in quantum physics


Just because you don't like the Copenhagen interpretation is no reason to dismiss it as nonsense... *that's* a nonsensical thing to do.




> ... every AP is nonsense except the weak one, and even it only amounts to a tautology.


I don't see that, would you like to spell it out?




> The rest just reveal what a strong anthropomorphic bias we have and how much we desperately want to think that everything exists for us.


I don't desperately want that, I just find the principle interesting & amusing. God knows if it's true or not, but you certainly haven't convinced me it is nonsense. Would Wheeler, and the many really bright physicists who hold it to be at least a possibility, push nonsense?

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## YesNo

> PAP is nonsense brought about by a fundamental misunderstanding of the observer role in quantum physics;


What misunderstanding? As I see it many worlds is more unbelievable than PAP although I don't think PAP is true either. 

I suspect PAP is based on the observation that when one looks at the electrons after they went through the double slit they behave as if they were observed prior to going through the double slit. That is, they behave as particles might behave rather than waves with interference patterns on the target wall. However, they already went through the double slit and because of that should have already got those wave interference patterns. 

Because of that it looks like present observations modify what happened in the past. I think that is the experimental evidence underlying PAP although I might have it wrong.




> It's not. See Krauss' A Universe from Nothing. Universes are an inevitable product of quantum fields, which seem to exist a part from those they create.


Or the product of fields of consciousness. It all depends on one's metaphysics. 

The "inevitable" is hand waving, but it is needed to not involve choice, which would require consciousness of some sort which would imply purpose. The "fields" are needed so one does not have a "thing". 

The ultimate metaphysical belief is that something can come from nothing by chance which is one I don't believe in.

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## YSiobhan

I vote for A) because that seems the least unlikely, but honestly I don't think we'll ever know for sure :/

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## MorpheusSandman

> Just because you don't like the Copenhagen interpretation is no reason to dismiss it as nonsense... *that's* a nonsensical thing to do.


Copenhagen conflicts with pretty much everything else we know of physics and places us at the center of the universe; as opposed to MW that assumes the wavefunction is real and works just fine without us; which is more likely? 




> I don't see that, would you like to spell it out?


Spell out why it's a tautology? Because it's basically saying "without a universe equipped to support life, life wouldn't be there to observe it." I'm not sure what's supposed to be profound about that. 




> Would Wheeler, and the many really bright physicists who hold it to be at least a possibility, push nonsense?


Yes. To quote Einstein: "Do you mean to tell me the moon doesn't exist if nobody is looking at it?" 

================================================== ================================================== =




> As I see it many worlds is more unbelievable than PAP although I don't think PAP is true either.


MW is unbelievable to you because you don't understand it, as you have demonstrated repeatedly across multiple threads. 




> Or the product of fields of consciousness. It all depends on one's metaphysics.


No, it doesn't. We know quantum fields exist, we know how they behave, and we know because of observing the behavior of vacuum energy that they possess everything necessary to create universes. On the other hand, we have not a stitch of evidence for any consciousness besides our own which, as far as we know, can only exist because of the matter and laws the universe brought into existence. What reason is there to assume there's anything like intelligence outside of those material confines? 




> The "inevitable" is hand waving, but it is needed to not involve choice, which would require consciousness of some sort which would imply purpose. The "fields" are needed so one does not have a "thing". 
> 
> The ultimate metaphysical belief is that something can come from nothing by chance which is one I don't believe in.


Luckily for us concerned with understanding reality, that understanding is not limited to what you believe or don't believe in. I'm sorry the facts conflict with your metaphysics. Go take it up with Krauss; you know, an actual scientist and not a message board pseudo-intellectual.

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## YesNo

> No, it doesn't. We know quantum fields exist, we know how they behave, and we know because of observing the behavior of vacuum energy that they possess everything necessary to create universes. On the other hand, we have not a stitch of evidence for any consciousness besides our own which, as far as we know, can only exist because of the matter and laws the universe brought into existence. What reason is there to assume there's anything like intelligence outside of those material confines?


Quantum fields exist, but do quantum fields exist _outside_ our space and time in order to generate our universe? 

We exhibit conscious, purposeful behavior. On that alone, a reasonable anthropic principle would require the universe to allow purposeful life.

I can see that my cat is also conscious so consciousness exists outside our own species.




> Luckily for us concerned with understanding reality, that understanding is not limited to what you believe or don't believe in. I'm sorry the facts conflict with your metaphysics. Go take it up with Krauss; you know, an actual scientist and not a message board pseudo-intellectual.


I've read Krauss's book. I didn't find it impressive even as a survey of science.

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## MorpheusSandman

> Quantum fields exist, but do quantum fields exist _outside_ our space and time in order to generate our universe?


They pretty much have to, at least if we're talking about spacetime _as we know it_. Spacetime is a product of gravity and gravity is a product of matter/mass, and spacetime in quantum vacuums is complete chaos because of the lack of sustained matters (particles popping in and out of existence). Spacetime would require some fluctuation to sustain itself long enough to exert some kind of consistent gravitational force and, because of that, spacetime as we know it. 




> We exhibit conscious, purposeful behavior. On that alone, a reasonable anthropic principle would require the universe to allow purposeful life.


The only thing the principle would require is for the universe to allow life that believes it has purposeful behavior, and that's something completely different than claiming the universe must've been created with a purpose. 




> I've read Krauss's book. I didn't find it impressive even as a survey of science.


You don't find anything impressive that conflicts with your metaphysics.

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## YesNo

> You don't find anything impressive that conflicts with your metaphysics.


People in general don't give up their metaphysics easily. There's nothing wrong with that. 

To expect them to do so would be like expecting them to accept an extraordinary claim (for them) based on flimsy or no evidence. It is probably a good thing that it doesn't often happen.

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## Jasmine lover

Cogito ergo sum.

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## mal4mac

> People in general don't give up their metaphysics easily.


It's not that hard. Go on, you can do it! No one will mind.




> To expect them to do so would be like expecting them to accept an extraordinary claim (for them) based on flimsy or no evidence. It is probably a good thing that it doesn't often happen.


I think it probably does often happen; what was the enlightenment all about? You just need not to accept anything without reasonable evidence. Isn't that easy? Isn't that a good thing? I find it a relief. Bye, bye metaphysical baggage! Good riddance...

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## YesNo

> It's not that hard. Go on, you can do it! No one will mind.
> 
> I think it probably does often happen; what was the enlightenment all about? You just need not to accept anything without reasonable evidence. Isn't that easy? Isn't that a good thing? I find it a relief. Bye, bye metaphysical baggage! Good riddance...


Maybe you're right. 

If I only meditate hard enough, faithfully for decades, maybe even I will finally believe there are many worlds or it really was the tooth fairy who left that quarter or no matter how fat Santa gets he can still slide through the exhaust flue.

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## Cioran

> MW is unbelievable to you because you don't understand it, as you have demonstrated repeatedly across multiple threads.


BINGO.

Repeatedly misrpresenting MW is a sure sign the interlocutor doesn't know (or care) what it says. The fact that he brushed off numerous papers to which I linked him shows he doesn't care.

He doesn't care because YesNo is one of those people who has decided what the world must be like (something comfortable and comforting to him) and no amount of facts or evidence are going to interfere with his prior beliefs.

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## cafolini

> BINGO.
> 
> Repeatedly misrpresenting MW is a sure sign the interlocutor doesn't know (or care) what it says. The fact that he brushed off numerous papers to which I linked him shows he doesn't care.
> 
> He doesn't care because YesNo is one of those people who has decided what the world must be like (something comfortable and comforting to him) and no amount of facts or evidence are going to interfere with his prior beliefs.


You vodka man are the one who argues from beliefs. YesNo is a very consistent skeptic and has always played that role. He argues about the validity of your drunkard's beliefs. You go drink another pood and sleep the monkey's.

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## mal4mac

Choosing by comfort seems a very reasonable way to proceed, given that there is no rational way to choose between the options... some physicists push Copenhagen, others many worlds, others... well one of a bushel of views. Holding to an unprovable view, that doesn't provide one with comfort, is enough to drive one to drink...

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## MorpheusSandman

> People in general don't give up their metaphysics easily. There's nothing wrong with that.


People in general are morons who don't understand how their own brain routinely distorts reality and invents its own and has no clue how to correctly process evidence in order to build reliable beliefs. Go ahead and be people in general; I prefer to be people in special. 




> You vodka man are the one who argues from beliefs. YesNo is a very consistent skeptic and has always played that role. He argues about the validity of your drunkard's beliefs. You go drink another pood and sleep the monkey's.


YesNo only argues against strawmen as he has continually failed to argue against the actual claims of MW, preferring instead to invent his own version and skewer it while avoiding all of the problems that Copenhagen et al. introduce. 




> Choosing by comfort seems a very reasonable way to proceed, given that there is no rational way to choose between the options... some physicists push Copenhagen, others many worlds, others... well one of a bushel of views. Holding to an unprovable view, that doesn't provide one with comfort, is enough to drive one to drink...


How is choosing by comfort a reasonable way to proceed? What in the world would make anyone think the world exists in a way that's comfortable for us? We're susceptible to about a billion things that can kill us as individuals and dozens that could easily wipe us out as a species. What is comforting about that? Plus, there IS a rational way to choose between options, even options where the evidence is not completely settled. If you take QM, then it's a matter of choosing which interpretation is simplest (Occam's Razor) and consistent with what we know, and both of those things favor MW and NOT Copenhagen. In fact, things like Bell's Theorem have made Copenhagen even more unlikely since we now know that no variables could account for all the discrepancies between QM and classical physics; so what else is there to explain why they clash except that it's QM all the way down, which gives us MW?

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## cafolini

> People in general are morons who don't understand how their own brain routinely distorts reality and invents its own and has no clue how to correctly process evidence in order to build reliable beliefs. Go ahead and be people in general; I prefer to be people in special. 
> 
> YesNo only argues against strawmen as he has continually failed to argue against the actual claims of MW, preferring instead to invent his own version and skewer it while avoiding all of the problems that Copenhagen et al. introduce. 
> 
> How is choosing by comfort a reasonable way to proceed? What in the world would make anyone think the world exists in a way that's comfortable for us? We're susceptible to about a billion things that can kill us as individuals and dozens that could easily wipe us out as a species. What is comforting about that? Plus, there IS a rational way to choose between options, even options where the evidence is not completely settled. If you take QM, then it's a matter of choosing which interpretation is simplest (Occam's Razor) and consistent with what we know, and both of those things favor MW and NOT Copenhagen. In fact, things like Bell's Theorem have made Copenhagen even more unlikely since we now know that no variables could account for all the discrepancies between QM and classical physics; so what else is there to explain why they clash except that it's QM all the way down, which gives us MW?


You have no respect for people. Your character is not fit for any redemption. Eventually you will regret it.

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## MorpheusSandman

> You have no respect for people.


I have no respect for people who choose to be ignorant/oblivious when facts are staring them in the face. Other than that, I respect people just fine. We've been hearing fire and brimstone threats since the dawn of religion; nothing to worry about there.

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## cafolini

> I have no respect for people who choose to be ignorant/oblivious when facts are staring them in the face. Other than that, I respect people just fine. We've been hearing fire and brimstone threats since the dawn of religion; nothing to worry about there.


What facts are there in Einstein's retardation about a unified field theory or Hawking's contract with the Roman Catholics to fabricate a new genesis. A toilet without water? The imagination without knowledge? This case has been closed. But I'll have to come back here and there to reveal your BS monopolizing the thread.

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## MorpheusSandman

> What facts are there in Einstein's retardation


I need say no more, since you're such a glowing example of why chosen ignorance shouldn't be respected. 




> But I'll have to come back here and there to reveal your BS monopolizing the thread.


LOL



```
Who Posted?

    Posts
        10 

    MorpheusSandman

    Posts
        10 

    mal4mac

    Posts
        8 

    cacian

    Posts
        8 

    cafolini

    Posts
        8 

    YesNo
```

I've posted as much as mal, and only have two more posts than you, cacian, and YesNo. Way to pwn yourself with statistics!

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## cafolini

> I need say no more, since you're such a glowing example of why chosen ignorance shouldn't be respected. 
> 
> LOL
> 
> 
> 
> ```
> Who Posted?
> 
> ...


All the cheap marketers that work with you, along the same lines.

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## YesNo

> Repeatedly misrpresenting MW is a sure sign the interlocutor doesn't know (or care) what it says. The fact that he brushed off numerous papers to which I linked him shows he doesn't care.


I read the links you posted. I just didn't agree with them. You might want to consider reading Roland Omnes, _Quantum Philosophy_. He worked on decoherence and doesn't like MW any more than I do. The critical thing that I took from Omnes text is that he claimed to have shown that there is no mathematical need to accept many worlds. One world is just as mathematically consistent.

So without evidence and with no logical need to accept MW, why bother with it? 

Furthermore, I don't think MW even delivers on its promise of determinacy and locality, because it seems from our own experience that we have some freedom and are not determined. Determinacy means that any freedom you might think you have is an illusion. I can't see why anyone would want to go to such extremes to maintain the illusion of determinacy.

PAP is more puzzling because there is at least a double slit experiment that lends it some credibility. MW seems like a way to deny that those double slit experiments are anything more than illusions.




> He doesn't care because YesNo is one of those people who has decided what the world must be like (something comfortable and comforting to him) and no amount of facts or evidence are going to interfere with his prior beliefs.


I agree with cafolini and mal4mac.

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## mal4mac

> People in general are morons who don't understand how their own brain routinely distorts reality and invents its own and has no clue how to correctly process evidence in order to build reliable beliefs. Go ahead and be people in general; I prefer to be people in special.


You don't seem special to me, not an insult by the way, I'm sure that, like most people, you're OK. And what's wrong with morons? There's a guy stacks shelves at my supermarket who obviously has learning difficulties, we have nice chats, it's great fun to be a person in general with him. Same with the cat next door, he's a moron, but a fun being...




> How is choosing by comfort a reasonable way to proceed? What in the world would make anyone think the world exists in a way that's comfortable for us?


I didn't say the world is designed to be comfortable for us, but, I think, if given a chance we should choose comfort. Why choose the simplest? There is nothing to show that simplest is correct. I think people choose it because it is more comfortable. Then when they discover they have to use GR instead of Newton's laws they are upset because there's a long night calculating ahead instead of a jaunt to the pub...

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## mal4mac

> What facts are there in Einstein's retardation about a unified field theory or Hawking's contract with the Roman Catholics to fabricate a new genesis.


Didn't Hawking suspend that contract in his last missive? I lose touch though; I don't find enough fun in the random walks of Schrodinger's cat these days. Much more fun in the "Count of Monte Cristo".

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## MorpheusSandman

> The critical thing that I took from Omnes text is that he claimed to have shown that there is no mathematical need to accept many worlds. One world is just as mathematically consistent. So without evidence and with no logical need to accept MW, why bother with it?


The converse of these sentences is also true: There is no mathematical need to accept single world/wavefunction collapse, MW is just as mathematically consistent. So without evidence and with no logical need to accept SW, why bother with it? That actually makes more sense considering MW wins via Occam's Razor. Copenhagen and other SW interps are more complicated and have to "add" things like hidden variables to explain why it conflicts with everything else we know. MW solves those conflicts and removes every additional variable. It's simpler, so it should win by default. It's the other interps that should have the burden of proof here. 




> Furthermore, I don't think MW even delivers on its promise of determinacy and locality, because it seems from our own experience that we have some freedom and are not determined. Determinacy means that any freedom you might think you have is an illusion. I can't see why anyone would want to go to such extremes to maintain the illusion of determinacy.


You hit the nail on the head when you said "it SEEMS from our own experience..." What SEEMS to us has been consistently proven wrong throughout the history of modern science, so why in the world you would think what "SEEMS to us" is in any way a reliable indication of reality? How do you separate our feeling of freedom and indeterminacy from our ignorance of deterministic processes? 




> MW seems like a way to deny that those double slit experiments are anything more than illusions.


cioran has explained this to you multiple times; the fact that you still bring it up is proof that you don't want to learn anything and are dead set against anything that argues in favor of MW and against all SW interpretations. IE, your bias is showing. 

================================================== ================================================== ====




> You don't seem special to me, not an insult by the way, I'm sure that, like most people, you're OK. And what's wrong with morons? There's a guy stacks shelves at my supermarket who obviously has learning difficulties, we have nice chats, it's great fun to be a person in general with him. Same with the cat next door, he's a moron, but a fun being...


All I meant by "special" was that I have educated myself about how my cognitive processes work, so I'm not at the whim of whatever illusions/delusions it concocts because of it coming equipped with billions of years worth of inherent biases that were more concerned with survival and reproduction than truth finding. I've nothing against "morons" per say, especially not those with learning disabilities, but there are plenty of people without such disabilities that prefer to remain ignorant instead of educated, that prefer to combine that ignorance with a cocksure arrogance that obstinately refuses to change regardless of what evidence is presented. This is the dark side of human cognition and what I fight against. The only way to overcome it is to, firstly, inform yourself about how your brain functions so you can avoid the biases that prevent reliable processing of evidence and belief-forming; and, secondly, to educate yourself as much as possible about the the world. Most don't do either, much less both. I do both. Hence the "people in general" VS "people in special." It's not just an IQ thing, it's a willingness to learn VS willingness to remain ignorant. 




> I didn't say the world is designed to be comfortable for us, but, I think, if given a chance we should choose comfort. Why choose the simplest? There is nothing to show that simplest is correct. I think people choose it because it is more comfortable. Then when they discover they have to use GR instead of Newton's laws they are upset because there's a long night calculating ahead instead of a jaunt to the pub...


I don't know what you mean "choose comfort if given a chance." We can ALWAYS choose comfort if we want. My question was what would make you think that what's comfortable is true? The reason to choose the simplest explanation amongst otherwise equals is because it's the most likely to be correct. Mathematically this can be proved via the conjunction fallacy, or, in laymen's terms, Occam's Razor. No, it doesn't guarantee that the simplest answer is correct, but it simply means it's more likely than others that are more comfortable. I agree that, eg, GR is more complicated than Newton, but it was known even in Newton's time that there were some things his theory didn't account for. The fact that GR was more complicated means nothing if it's demonstrably more accurate. But if you're talking something like QM where all you have are varying interpretations that are all consistent with the math, we should prefer the simplest explanation, and the simplest explanation is Many-Worlds By FAR.

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## YesNo

> The converse of these sentences is also true: There is no mathematical need to accept single world/wavefunction collapse, MW is just as mathematically consistent.


Because the Copenhagen interpretation is a simpler solution that doesn't violate experience including evidence in double slit experiments. 

We don't experience many worlds. We experience one.




> So without evidence and with no logical need to accept SW, why bother with it?


There is evidence to accept QM. The solution that requires the least number of unverified worlds would be the best.




> That actually makes more sense considering MW wins via Occam's Razor.


Dismissing the wave function collapse might make some think that MW is simpler, but it turns out the consequences of that removal brings with it many worlds which is far from simple. So MW loses via Occam's Razor.




> Copenhagen and other SW interps are more complicated and have to "add" things like hidden variables to explain why it conflicts with everything else we know.


The Copenhagen interpretation does not require hidden variables and requires only one world. It doesn't conflict with the double slit experiment which is something that "we know". It also doesn't conflict with our sense that we have at least some freedom which is also something that "we know" we have. 




> MW solves those conflicts and removes every additional variable. It's simpler, so it should win by default. It's the other interps that should have the burden of proof here.


Here's a quote from Wikipedia about Carl Sagan: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Sagan

Sagan is also widely regarded as a freethinker or skeptic; one of his most famous quotations, in Cosmos, was, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence"
Many worlds proponents make a lot of _extraordinary claims_. The existence of many worlds is one of them. So, where is the _extraordinary evidence_ to back up this extraordinary claim?




> You hit the nail on the head when you said "it SEEMS from our own experience..." What SEEMS to us has been consistently proven wrong throughout the history of modern science, so why in the world you would think what "SEEMS to us" is in any way a reliable indication of reality? How do you separate our feeling of freedom and indeterminacy from our ignorance of deterministic processes?


Without experience or evidence science would make no progress. It would all be one metaphysical claim at odds with the other. 

The claim that our experience of freedom is an illusion is an _extraordinary claim_. So, where is the _extraordinary evidence_?

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## MorpheusSandman

> Because the Copenhagen interpretation is a simpler solution doesn't violate experience including evidence in double slit experiments.


Wrong on both accounts. MW is demonstrably, factually simpler than Copenhagen and MW doesn't violate either experience or anything in the double slit experiment. See here for a laymen's explanation, since you don't seem to respond to any of the technical stuff: http://www.askamathematician.com/201...r-many-worlds/

To quote the most salient part: 


> Youll often hear that theres no experiment that can be done to prove which approach is the correct one. Im of the opinion that the experiments have already been done, but that most people (myself included) dont like the results. However, among people who have stopped to consider the options (and there arent many good reasons to do so), most of us have decided to accept the results and move on.
> 
> The big advantage behind the Copenhagen interpretation is that it makes people (like you!) important, and different from particles. <sarcasm>Sure, they may be in multiple states, but Im definitely in exactly one state. Unlike particles, people can tell the difference.</sarcasm>
> 
> Its creepy to think that there are different versions of yourself out there doing stuff, but its awesome to assume that youre special and that your mind (not brain) has some kind of power over reality...
> 
> Time and again, weve managed to show that larger and larger objects can be in multiple states, using the double slit experiment or variations of it. At last check, the double slit experiment was successfully preformed on C60F48, which has fully 108 atoms, or 2,424 protons, neutrons, and electrons. The entire molecule (actually, thousands of them) actually interfered with itself, demonstrating the ability to be in multiple states.
> 
> Which raises the question: whats the damn problem? Everything that can be tested has demonstrated quantum superposition, so why not just extend that to everything obeys the same quantum mechanical laws, including superposition.? Why not indeed?
> ...





> We don't experience many worlds. We experience one.


We experience exactly what MW predicts we would experience if MW is true. 




> The solution that requires the least number of unverified worlds would be the best.


The irony is that MW doesn't "require" any unverified worlds. I'm starting to think the entire problem is in the name itself; it's a bit like how they changed "global warming" to "climate change" because people couldn't grok how "global warming" could also be responsible for harsher winters. Similarly, people can't grok "many worlds" that we don't "experience," but the many worlds are just a product of assuming it's QP all the way down as opposed to there being some unknown variables or some invisible split between the classic and quantum worlds. It's the latter that makes Copenhagen and all other SW interpretations "more complex" because they have to propose that there's *something* out there we don't know that can account for the discrepancies, and they're assuming these additional complexities without a stitch of evidence and, in fact, with all the evidence against them. 




> Dismissing the wave function collapse might make some think that MW is simpler, but it turns out the consequences of that removal brings with it many worlds which is far from simple. So MW loses via Occam's Razor.


Completely, ***-backwards wrong. Occam's razor would favor any simple initial equation that leads to a complex outcome, not a complex initial equation that leads to a simpler outcome. In fact, where you start is really all that matters, because it's the probability of the initial assumption that's in question. Anything that happens as a consequence of it is _completely irrelevant_ to its probability of being true. The MW themselves do not violate Occam's Razor because they are not a part of the initial equation. 




> The Copenhagen interpretation does not require hidden variables and requires only one world.


The Copenhagen requires something (hidden variables were initially proposed) to reconcile them with every physical law they violate, including conservation of information, time reversibility, and non-locality. 




> Many worlds proponents make a lot of _extraordinary claims_.


No they don't. It's the Copenhagen proponents who are making the extraordinary claims that we should trust their interpretation in spite of all the contradictions it creates with what we know about physics and logic. The only claim MW proponents are making is that it's QM all the way down, there is no "split" between the quantum/macro worlds, and that the wavefunction is a real object. None of those claims are extraordinary. Many worlds is a result of those claims. It's the result you have a problem with, not the claims. 




> The claim that our experience of freedom is an illusion is an _extraordinary claim_.


Why is it an extraordinary claim? Actual freedom is indistinguishable from an illusion created by our ignorance of deterministic processes. What in the world is "extraordinary" about claiming we are ignorant of deterministic processes?

Let's recap the relevant points: 

1. Many Worlds = Quantum Physics works all the way down, ie, there is no "split" between classical/quantum worlds, no hidden variables and the wavefunction is a real object. 
2. Quantum Physics works all the way down = confirmed by every test done thus far, including placing quite large objects in superposition 
3. Many Worlds = Compatible with everything else we know about physics, including GR, locality, determinism, forward flow of time, conservation of information, etc. 
4. The many worlds themselves = completely irrelevant to the initial claims that produce those worlds. They shouldn't really even be an issue. Someone bringing up the "many worlds" themselves as an argument against MW is doing nothing but showing their ignorance of what MW claims really are

As opposed to: 

5. Copenhagen = There are hidden variables or some split between the quantum/classical world that causes a wave to "collapse" when observed by a human/consciousness that is not at the mercy of those same quantum processes. 
6. Those hidden variables or split = Not confirmed by anything and add complexity to the entire equation unnecessarily. 
7. Copenhagen = Incompatible with everything else we know about physics, including GR, locality, determinism, forward flow of time, conservation of information
8. The single world itself = completely irrelevant to the initial claims that produce that single world. 

If one pares away 4 and 8 from the above and just _looks_ at the claims being made by both interpretations and checks those against the actual tests that have been done, there is no question that Many Worlds is an infinitely better and more likely interpretation. There is _no good reason_ to prefer Copenhagen. The reasons you (and others) prefer Copenhagen is because: 

1. You don't want to believe you don't have free will
2. You don't want to believe that you're just as subject to the "multiple states" that all particles are. 
3. You want to believe you're "special" and that consciousness is "special" and whatever. 
4. To justify these things you want/don't want to believe, you argue against MW by arguing against the many worlds themselves, _which don't matter_ at all. 

Basically, it's gross anthropomorphic bias that prevents you from believing MW and blinds you to all the problems of Copenhagen. You are not being lead by the evidence or by the actual claims being made, you're being lead by what you want to be true. It's the worst kind of Santa Clause syndrome; ignore all the problems created by the notion of a fat man flying around the world in a night delivering presents to children because, after all, it's a comforting thought that makes you feel good.

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## mal4mac

> I've nothing against "morons" per say, especially not those with learning disabilities, but there are plenty of people without such disabilities that prefer to remain ignorant instead of educated, that prefer to combine that ignorance with a cocksure arrogance that obstinately refuses to change regardless of what evidence is presented.


Maybe they are not morons, just find thinking hard work, and, instead, choose just to live in an average unthinking way. Why change if they are happy? The Ancient Sceptics suggested living with the conditions you find, because nothing is sure, might as well take the easy path; so your "morons" are taking up an intellectual position that is difficult to argue against, albeit unthinkingly. 

One ancient skeptic (Zeno?) was caught in a storm on a ship and knowing what happens to ships in a storm was rather worried, along with his fellow humans, who were running about panicking. But the pig on board just kept happily eating his swill. Zeno was envious of that pig and sought ways to emulate him. Perhaps morons are our teachers? Our guide to happiness..

You see this in Tolstoy as well, with Levin (In Anna K.) envious of the serfs, never so happy as when he is working in the fields with them, never so unhappy as when he is having deep thoughts caused by reading Schopenhauer et. al.




> I don't know what you mean "choose comfort if given a chance." We can ALWAYS choose comfort if we want.


I don't see that... what about inner demons, or just not knowing where true comfort lies?

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## Scheherazade

Not everyone's understanding of "comfort" is the same... Just same as we wouldn't/couldn't agree on how to reach that state.

"True comfort" is a semantic trap to ease your ideas and moral values (if not force) upon others.

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## MorpheusSandman

> Maybe they are not morons, just find thinking hard work, and, instead, choose just to live in an average unthinking way. Why change if they are happy? The Ancient Sceptics suggested living with the conditions you find, because nothing is sure, might as well take the easy path; so your "morons" are taking up an intellectual position that is difficult to argue against, albeit unthinkingly.


In general, I wouldn't ask someone to change if they're happy, only if they are making decisions to further that happiness based on their ignorance that affects others. Sadly, this is pretty much how politics and human societies operate. The people who vote are the often the ones most ignorant about the issues, the facts, and how what they're doing affects others. Plus, if someone is ignorant, it's best advised they don't go around talking about that something like they aren't ignorant. Humans being social animals means it's hard for one to be ignorant and happy without either one affecting others. 




> I don't see that... what about inner demons, or just not knowing where true comfort lies?


I think we're talking two different things; I just meant people can choose to believe something is true/untrue because it's comfortable/uncomfortable. This doesn't guarantee that they will always be comfortable, never face inner demons, etc., it simply means they will choose not to add to their discomforts. So, eg, one might choose to believe in an afterlife because it's a comforting thought, but this doesn't make the notion of an afterlife true, nor does it mean that person will be completely comfortable when it's their time to die.

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## mal4mac

> I think we're talking two different things; I just meant people can choose to believe something is true/untrue because it's comfortable/uncomfortable. This doesn't guarantee that they will always be comfortable, never face inner demons, etc., it simply means they will choose not to add to their discomforts. So, eg, one might choose to believe in an afterlife because it's a comforting thought, but this doesn't make the notion of an afterlife true, nor does it mean that person will be completely comfortable when it's their time to die.


Can one choose to believe in something? I'd like to believe in an afterlife, but I'm too skeptical. If there is a difference of opinion like MW/Copenhagen I find it more comfortable not to adopt any position.

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## cafolini

> Can one choose to believe in something? I'd like to believe in an afterlife, but I'm too skeptical. If there is a difference of opinion like MW/Copenhagen I find it more comfortable not to adopt any position.


I don't think you have to adopt any position at all, except the recognition of the Mystery we are. That's not enough to give up your skepticism, but it is enough not to postulate it as necessary either, which I accept you do not do.
Let's see. It's 9 AM here and all's well. Have fun. God bless you.

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## MorpheusSandman

> Can one choose to believe in something?


Well, I guess that would depend on whether you think one can "choose" anything (ie, the question of free-will). I don't know if we consciously "choose" to believe something the way, eg, you might look in your fridge and "choose" to drink milk as opposed to water. Beliefs are more of an unconscious, cumulative thing. EG, I can't pick a singular moment where I went "OK, I choose to believe MW is most likely true," it just slowly seemed more and more true the more I researched QM. 




> If there is a difference of opinion like MW/Copenhagen I find it more comfortable not to adopt any position.


You can find a difference of opinion on any matter if you look hard enough. There are people who deny the holocaust, think the Earth is 6000 years old, that evolution is a myth, etc. These aren't differences of opinions, they're differences in how people attain and logically process facts. Similar with MW/Copenhagen, all of the evidence out there favors MW. Those who choose to reject it do so because they don't like what it implies, not because they don't think what it claims is most likely to be true. It's a bit like how some look at many of the things evolution implies--ie, that we're no different than other animals, that we were not "created," that morality is not objective but a bi-product of social evolution, etc.--and reject it because of that; they don't reject it because the evidence isn't overwhelmingly in favor of it, and that's a horrible way to arrive at true beliefs.

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## mal4mac

> ... with MW/Copenhagen, all of the evidence out there favors MW. Those who choose to reject it do so because they don't like what it implies, not because they don't think what it claims is most likely to be true.


Well that's what you say, but I can't believe that most professional quantum physicists are denying the truth simply because they don't like the implications. I mean the implications are not all that dislikeable, anyway. Why didn't the atomic physicists deny the possibility of an atom bomb... now there's a case where you might think dis-likeability would have made them ignore the truth! But just because they think a multitude of universes seems a bit excessive, at first sight, they aren't going to deny the truth!

So to an "outsider", and even with a physics degree I count myself as an outsider, it can only look like you are tub thumping for your favourite interpretation. Nothing wrong with that, but I don't see you having any success in persuading anyone in this thread that MW is *the* true description of reality. Even if you did, it's the wrong tack! You need to do what Eddington did with GR, he moved heaven & earth to perform the eclipse experiment that persuaded (just about) all physicists that GR was correct, and the public (me, YesNo, et. al.) then followed along in admiring GR as a great theory. So why not devote all the energy you put into these threads into devising an experiment that shows MW to be the one true theory? Or if you think the evidence is already there, why not devote your time to convincing the doubting physicists, those are the ones who will raise you to special status if you succeed! Not me and YesNo.

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## MorpheusSandman

> Well that's what you say, but I can't believe that most professional quantum physicists are denying the truth simply because they don't like the implications.


Most of them aren't denying it, at least depending on who you ask. The largest poll done had a result of 58% of 72 leading cosmologists saying they believed MW was true, only 18% rejected it, and the other 26% were either in the "not sure" or "no opinion" camp. Now, that poll is "controversial" in that it's unclear just how representative it is of the actual majority view but, AFAIK, no better/larger one has been done. Most others commenting on it are just going off their own experience. At worst we could say it's unclear how "accepted" it is. However, I don't know why you'd find it surprising that scientists are human too and would have trouble letting go of their previous assumptions (more on this later). 




> I mean the implications are not all that dislikeable, anyway.


What's unlikable about it is that there's no (apparent) way to "contact/confirm" these other worlds even if the interp is true. It also implies (again, depending on whom you ask; the issue is a bit more complicated than some like YesNo make it out to be) that we have no free-will, since everything that can happen does happen in one world or another. When you "make a decision" all that's really happening are the particles that make you up are "going one way" in the world you experience now and yet they also "went the other way" in another world you aren't experiencing (actually, this is a gross simplification and leads to misunderstandings of the interp, but to explain it more accurately would require much more time/space/info). That's a very unpleasant thought to many, essentially taking away any sense of "specialty" that we humans felt we had as a life-form. It also has to do with the fact that Copenhagen came first and got very entrenched in the literature, and even scientists are not quick to let go of their metaphysical assumptions, especially for something as counter-intuitive as MW. 




> So to an "outsider", and even with a physics degree I count myself as an outsider, it can only look like you are tub thumping for your favourite interpretation. Nothing wrong with that, but I don't see you having any success in persuading anyone in this thread that MW is *the* true description of reality. Even if you did, it's the wrong tack! You need to do what Eddington did with GR, he moved heaven & earth to perform the eclipse experiment that persuaded (just about) all physicists that GR was correct, and the public (me, YesNo, et. al.) then followed along in admiring GR as a great theory. So why not devote all the energy you put into these threads into devising an experiment that shows MW to be the one true theory? Or if you think the evidence is already there, why not devote your time to convincing the doubting physicists, those are the ones who will raise you to special status if you succeed! Not me and YesNo.


Perhaps I'm "tubthumping" to an extent, but you won't find anything I've claimed to be untrue. Plus, go back to less than a year ago and you'll find that I was very much on the fence on this issue. It took me reading a lot into it to realize that it was the best interpretation by, like, a whole lot. Even now, though, I'm not insisting that MW HAS to be true, what I'm saying is that, thus far, all the evidence is in favor of MW and it is by far the most _likely_ answer. 

The problem with "proving" MW is that there's nothing really like Eddington's eclipse experiment that can be done; ie, there's no ONE experiment that can prove MW since what it's claiming--that QP works all the way down and that there's no "split" between the quantum and classic worlds--can only really be falsified, not confirmed. If the theory is true, then what we'd expect to find was that all objects (including us) would be in superposition, and, thus far, all objects we're capable of putting in superposition have indeed been shown to be in superposition. See this extract: 


> Time and again, weve managed to show that larger and larger objects can be in multiple states, using the double slit experiment or variations of it. At last check, the double slit experiment was successfully preformed on C60F48, which has fully 108 atoms, or 2,424 protons, neutrons, and electrons. The entire molecule (actually, thousands of them) actually interfered with itself, demonstrating the ability to be in multiple states.
> 
> Which raises the question: whats the damn problem? Everything that can be tested has demonstrated quantum superposition, so why not just extend that to everything obeys the same quantum mechanical laws, including superposition.? Why not indeed?
> 
> One may be tempted to say the physics at small scales is just different!. Fair enough. However, there are no physical laws that work differently on different scales. For example, at very small scales water acts like honey, and to swim you need to use things like flagella. At the other end of the scale (our scale) water behaves like water, and things like fins and flippers suddenly work really well, but flagella dont. However, the same physical laws (specifically, the Navier-Stokes equation) govern everything.
> 
> More generally, all laws apply at all scales, its just a question of degree. Relativity works at all velocities, but you dont notice the weird effects until youre moving really fast. What we call Newtons laws are just an approximation that work at low speeds.
> 
> If the Copenhagen size argument (that larger objects somehow have different laws) holds up, itll be the first of its kind.


You may also be interested in reading this: http://lesswrong.com/lw/q8/many_worlds_one_best_guess/ which is a longer, more thorough synopsis of why MW is the "best guess" we have, and it also proposes some theories about why it's not even more widely accepted than it is. I think one thing it doesn't mention is that there are a lot of physicists that _just don't care._ There's now a very common group of physicists that just say "shut up and calculate" without worrying about the implications of what interp is right. As Cioran has mentioned before, this wasn't good enough for someone like Einstein, who was as much a natural philosopher as he was a scientist (and he did not support Copenhagen; though Einstein proposed hidden variables, which was ruled out by Bell's Theorem shortly after Einstein's death). Einstein wanted to know "the truth," and a lot of modern scientists don't care, since "the truth" wouldn't really impact their ability to use quantum calculations for practical (ie, engineering) purposes. Regardless, here's a good extract from that article: 


> When we turn our attention to macroscopic phenomena, our sight is obscured. We cannot experiment on the wavefunction of a human in the way that we can experiment on the wavefunction of a hydrogen atom. In no case can you actually read off the wavefunction with a little quantum scanner. But in the case of, say, a human, the size of the entire organism defeats our ability to perform precise calculations or precise experimentswe cannot confirm that the quantum equations are being obeyed in precise detail.
> 
> We know that phenomena commonly thought of as "quantum" do not just disappear when many microscopic objects are aggregated. Lasers put out a flood of coherent photons, rather than, say, doing something completely different. Atoms have the chemical characteristics that quantum theory says they should, enabling them to aggregate into the stable molecules making up a human.
> 
> So in one sense, we have a great deal of evidence that quantum laws are aggregating to the macroscopic level without too much difference. Bulk chemistry still works.
> 
> But we cannot directly verify that the particles making up a human, have an aggregate wavefunction that behaves exactly the way the simplest quantum laws say. Oh, we know that molecules and atoms don't disintegrate, we know that macroscopic mirrors still reflect from the middle. We can get many high-level predictions from the assumption that the microscopic and the macroscopic are governed by the same laws, and every prediction tested has come true.
> 
> But if someone were to claim that the macroscopic quantum picture, differs from the microscopic one, in some as-yet-untestable detailsomething that only shows up at the unmeasurable 20th decimal place of microscopic interactions, but aggregates into something bigger for macroscopic interactionswell, we can't prove they're wrong. It is Occam's Razor that says, "There are zillions of new fundamental laws you could postulate in the 20th decimal place; why are you even thinking about this one?"


FWIW, I'm not a physicist myself, so I have no hope of convincing any scientist of authority that MW is the best interp. In fact, I haven't formally studied science since high school. I'm just an interested amateur. I look to those much smarter than myself to tell me how reality works, and I try my hardest to cross-check what they say against what other smart people say that disagree. MW is one of those cases where I eventually realized there were no good arguments against what it's fundamentally claiming. Those that do argue against it seem to be arguing wholly against what it implies, not what against it claims. EG, you can read over this long thread, and if you know anything about MW you will immediately understand that the _vast majority_ of objections being made are not objections to what MW is actually claiming; the MW proponents in that thread are having to repeatedly point this out, just as I have done for YesNo in this thread and others. 

This is not to say that MW has no problems/is a perfect interp. Right now, the biggest issue with MW is: "where do the Born probabilities come from?" There is no definitive answer to this right now, but there are many interesting possibilities, one of which is given here: http://lesswrong.com/lw/py/the_born_probabilities/ However, to me, and I suspect to all MW proponents, this "problem" is infinitely smaller than the problems facing Copenhagen. Copenhagen literally seems to contradict everything else we know about how reality functions, and there are no explanations for why this is ("shut up and calculate" started precisely because nobody could figure out why it was). Put another way, the problems Copenhagen create are completely absurd and contrary to everything else we know; while with MW we have one major question that is irksome, but it certainly doesn't overturn everything else about reality.

----------


## Cioran

Posts like these are why I stopped bothering with this site long ago, and only ocasionally check in for a hoot. Whether it's a discussion of art, literature, creative writing, philosophy or science, the dum dums and trolls always dominate. Also, the software here is horrible. When you try to use quick reply or advanced reply, you are always automatically scrolled to the top, as you are trying to reply to something lower in the reply field. Terrible incompetence in whoever runs this site.




> I read the links you posted. I just didn't agree with them.


Why should anyone care whether you agree with them or not, since you have repeatedly demonstrated that you don't even understand what MW says? Also, I do not believe when you say you read the links I gave. Sorry.




> Furthermore, I don't think MW even delivers on its promise of determinacy and locality ...


Of course it does! Just another example of how you don't understand it at all.




> ... because it seems from our own experience that we have some freedom and are not determined.



Holy ... mackeral! So, for you, determinism is the opposite of free will?

Hint: It's not. 




> PAP is more puzzling because there is at least a double slit experiment that lends it some credibility. MW seems like a way to deny that those double slit experiments are anything more than illusions.


Of course, wholly wrong again. MW _explains_ the otherwise inexplicaable two-slit experiment.




> I agree with cafolini and mal4mac.


Who cares?

----------


## MorpheusSandman

> When you try to use quick reply or advanced reply, you are always automatically scrolled to the top, as you are trying to reply to something lower in the reply field.


Really? This site doesn't do that for me.  :Confused:  That said, I agree there are some trolls and dum-dums around here, but that's true of almost every forum... certainly every free/non-invite forum. 




> So, for you, determinism is the opposite of free will?
> 
> Hint: It's not.


This depends on how one defines "free will." I think determinism opposes ontological free-will, but not subjective free-will (meaning that our ignorance of deterministic processes is identical, in terms of our subjective experience, to actual free will).

----------


## The Kid

> a) by a single detonator as big as a bang
> or





> c) was it by god 's power and the garden of eden syndrome ?


This is a really long thread and I'm not going to read most of the response. But I do want to say that I understand these two proposals (a) and (c) to be the exact same. I mean the big bang suggests a sudden creation, as do the biblical creation stories. The difference is the biblical stories take it further along the road of creation, so God creates everything a little more quickly in those stories.

Does it really matter that it was instant or gradual? I'm just happy it got created.

----------


## cafolini

> Posts like these are why I stopped bothering with this site long ago, and only ocasionally check in for a hoot. Whether it's a discussion of art, literature, creative writing, philosophy or science, the dum dums and trolls always dominate. Also, the software here is horrible. When you try to use quick reply or advanced reply, you are always automatically scrolled to the top, as you are trying to reply to something lower in the reply field. Terrible incompetence in whoever runs this site.
> 
> 
> 
> Why should anyone care whether you agree with them or not, since you have repeatedly demonstrated that you don't even understand what MW says? Also, I do not believe when you say you read the links I gave. Sorry.
> 
> 
> 
> Of course it does! Just another example of how you don't understand it at all.
> ...


Fermi's slit is and remains theoretical.
Yours, instead, is a completely symmetrical boomerang. When you fart, the two streams come back. Watch out.

----------


## YesNo

> We experience exactly what MW predicts we would experience if MW is true.


MW predicts that we cannot verify these other worlds. Since Roland Omnes has shown that logically we are not required to accept MW--one world would do just fine as far as QM is concerned--MW is an interpretation driven by a metaphysics that _wants_ determinism. It will go after determinism even when uncertainty is what the evidence presents.




> It's the latter that makes Copenhagen and all other SW interpretations "more complex" because they have to propose that there's *something* out there we don't know that can account for the discrepancies, and they're assuming these additional complexities without a stitch of evidence and, in fact, with all the evidence against them.


There are no hidden variables. So Copenhagen is not assuming there's something out there. It is MW that is making the assumption there are many worlds out there to explain the uncertainty which violates its metaphysics.




> Completely, ***-backwards wrong. Occam's razor would favor any simple initial equation that leads to a complex outcome, not a complex initial equation that leads to a simpler outcome. In fact, where you start is really all that matters, because it's the probability of the initial assumption that's in question. Anything that happens as a consequence of it is _completely irrelevant_ to its probability of being true. The MW themselves do not violate Occam's Razor because they are not a part of the initial equation.


MW is similar to the original Anthropic Principle that Brandon Carter proposed and mal4mac cited elsewhere: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle

In both cases, one is faced with a situation where it looks like some choice was made. To remove choice, because it is metaphysically unacceptable, all possibilities have to be available so choice is not needed. In Carter's case, he came up with the existence of a multiverse where every possible initial condition generates its own universe. Then he can argue that we just happen to be living in the universe that allows us to exist. In the MW case, every possible choice has to be part of a new world. That allows MW to describe choice as not a choice.

The many worlds are primary, not the weakening of the wave function. Because the wave function is linear it allows one, with sufficient hand-waving, to assume that there might be a way to get those many worlds into the mathematics describing QM. 





> Why is it an extraordinary claim? Actual freedom is indistinguishable from an illusion created by our ignorance of deterministic processes. What in the world is "extraordinary" about claiming we are ignorant of deterministic processes?


The reason it is extraordinary is that we experience ourselves making choices. No matter how influenced we are in those choices, we experience them as choices. No one should give up their experience without evidence. That is not the scientific way. But that is what MW wants us to do. 

MW makes the extraordinary claim, violating our experience (evidence), that any choice we make is an illusion and expects us to accept that claim without evidence. Why? Because its adherents believe in a deterministic metaphysics that not only QM contradicts, but their own experience contradicts as well. 





> 1. You don't want to believe you don't have free will


It is not a belief, but an experience. We also act purposefully. If you have evidence to counter that, please present your extraordinary evidence for the extraordinary claim. Without that evidence, I would have to go with the evidence of my own experience. 




> 2. You don't want to believe that you're just as subject to the "multiple states" that all particles are.


I am not interested in _believing_ anything one way or the other in this context. We are all subject to QM. 




> 3. You want to believe you're "special" and that consciousness is "special" and whatever.


I don't know what you mean by "special". From my perspective, consciousness is involved with any choice. It doesn't make me special to have consciousness. 




> 4. To justify these things you want/don't want to believe, you argue against MW by arguing against the many worlds themselves, _which don't matter_ at all.


Again, I am not interested in _believing_ anything in this context. I need evidence and argument. Nothing else will convince me.




> Basically, it's gross anthropomorphic bias that prevents you from believing MW and blinds you to all the problems of Copenhagen. You are not being lead by the evidence or by the actual claims being made, you're being lead by what you want to be true. It's the worst kind of Santa Clause syndrome; ignore all the problems created by the notion of a fat man flying around the world in a night delivering presents to children because, after all, it's a comforting thought that makes you feel good.


MW looks to me like a Hail Mary pass by a reactionary metaphysics that got caught in a desperate position with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It is looking for any way out so it doesn't lose the game. That it has to postulate the existence of many worlds to get out of its mess only further convinces me that the underlying metaphysics is wrong.

----------


## MorpheusSandman

YesNo, I normally don't say this about other human beings, because, perhaps despite all the evidence to the contrary, I'm an optimist; but the evidence staring me right in the face that you are completely and utterly hopeless. You don't understand MW, you don't want to understand MW, every argument you make against MW has absolutely nothing to do with what MW is claiming, every argument you make just reveals your metaphysical biases that is leading you to reject something before you even understand it. Cioran and I have tried to explain to you what MW is actually claiming 1,000,000 ways from Sunday, and you still don't get it. 

It's remarkable how dense you are, and at some point I have to conclude one of a few options: either you're an intentional troll, who actually DOES understand what we're saying but is only posting to cause trouble because you're a bored, sad, lonely human being; or you're intellectually incapable of understanding MW to begin with; or you're not getting it because your metaphysical biases is not allowing you to get it because you unconsciously don't want to, since getting it may require you to actually formulate arguments that you are incapable of making. Perhaps it's the optimist in me that has me leaning towards the third option. But in no thread where this has been discussed have you yet to form an argument against what MW is actually claiming. 

But, despite all the evidence of the utter futility of this, I'll respond anyway. 




> MW predicts that we cannot verify these other worlds. Since Roland Omnes has shown that logically we are not required to accept MW--one world would do just fine as far as QM is concerned--MW is an interpretation driven by a metaphysics that _wants_ determinism. It will go after determinism even when uncertainty is what the evidence presents.


MW explains why we can not experience these other worlds, because we split along with the particles being observed. WE are in a state of superposition just like particles are. I don't know what you mean by "logically required to accept MW." What would a logical argument be that would REQUIRE one to accept any interpretation of anything? One world "does just fine" if you have no problem with all of the conflicts and nonsense that those one world interpretations creates with everything else we know about physics, and if you have no problem violating occam's razor and assuming things happen for no reason by inexplicable magic. And, no, for the billionth time, MW is an interpretation driven by what the experiments (those done by placing increasingly large objects in superposition) and theories (Bell's Theory against hidden variables) are telling us; that QM works all the way down, there are no micro/macro splits, no hidden variables, no wavefunction collapse. 




> There are no hidden variables. So Copenhagen is not assuming there's something out there. It is MW that is making the assumption there are many worlds out there to explain the uncertainty which violates its metaphysics.


If CI is not assuming hidden variables, then explain all of the conflicts that CI creates with everything else we know about physics: why do we have two different laws for large objects and small ones? Where is this split? What causes the wavefunction to collapse how it does and why? How is it that particles can affect each other at great distances at thousands of times faster than the speed of light? Unless you can answer these questions, CI is NOT a good interpretation. 

And, for the billionth and first time, MW is not assuming there are many worlds out there, MW is assuming quantum physics works all the way down. Assuming QP works all the way down gives us many worlds as a consequence. The many worlds are a consequence, not an assumption. Please try to understand that. 




> MW is similar to the original Anthropic Principle that Brandon Carter proposed and mal4mac cited elsewhere: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle
> 
> In both cases, one is faced with a situation where it looks like some choice was made. To remove choice, because it is metaphysically unacceptable, all possibilities have to be available so choice is not needed. In Carter's case, he came up with the existence of a multiverse where every possible initial condition generates its own universe. Then he can argue that we just happen to be living in the universe that allows us to exist. In the MW case, every possible choice has to be part of a new world. That allows MW to describe choice as not a choice.
> 
> The many worlds are primary, not the weakening of the wave function. Because the wave function is linear it allows one, with sufficient hand-waving, to assume that there might be a way to get those many worlds into the mathematics describing QM.


WTF does this have to do with my post about how MW doesn't violate Occam's Razor? All of this is literally a string of non-sequitors. "the many worlds are primary, not the weakening of the wave function," WHAT IN THE CATFUNKING BLOODY CARCASS OF A RAT DOES THAT EVEN MEAN?!!! I also have no clue what you mean by the wavefunction being linear and allowing many worlds with hand waving. What part about "If QP works all the way down you get MW" don't you understand? 




> The reason it is extraordinary is that we experience ourselves making choices. No matter how influenced we are in those choices, we experience them as choices. No one should give up their experience without evidence. That is not the scientific way. But that is what MW wants us to do.


I asked you a question you did not answer: what would make this distinguishable from us feeling like we make choices because we are ignorant of deterministic processes? How would we tell the difference? It is not an extraordinary claim to say we are ignorant of deterministic processes. If I were to flip a coin, physics determines how it will land, but my finite brain cannot calculate the physics necessary to know how it will land, so my ignorance creates the 50/50 probability of the coin toss. Choices are similar; if I'm ignorant of the deterministic processes going on in my brain, then my feeling of "choice" would be identical to that ignorance. I feel a "choice" because I am "ignorant" of determinism is the same thing of the coin toss being 50/50 because I'm ignorant of the deterministic physics. This is not an extraordinary claim because it equally matches what we experience AND has support by the fact that we know we ARE ignorant of such processes outside our brains. 




> expects us to accept that claim without evidence. Why?


Because MW has evidence in the fact that every object we're capable of placing in superposition has been found to be in superposition, and it works with everything else we know about physics, and it doesn't propose any additional things that violate Occam's Razor and other scientific laws. 




> It is not a belief, but an experience.


You experience the sun moving across the sky. You experience standing on a flat Earth. How is "free will" any different from those experiences? 




> I am not interested in _believing_ anything one way or the other in this context. We are all subject to QM.


Actually, not according to CI! If you believe Copenhagen, then you must believe we are not subject to the same QM laws as particles. It's MW that says that humans are as much a part of the system as what they're observing. 




> I don't know what you mean by "special". From my perspective, consciousness is involved with any choice. It doesn't make me special to have consciousness.


Sure it does, it makes you "special" in that you are more than the particles that make you up and you are "special" in that you are not subject to the same laws. If you believe Copenhagen, you believe that. The fact that you don't know you believe that goes to show how you have no f'ing clue what we're talking about. 




> I need evidence and argument. Nothing else will convince me.


We've given you the evidence. MW claims that everything at all levels are obeying the laws of QM. So far, all the experiments we've done on placing larger objects in superposition confirm this. So far, no experiments violate this. That means the evidence favors MW. MW says there are no micro/macro splits, no hidden variables, and, therefore, no wavefunction collapse. If you believe in the collapse then you have to believe there are hidden variables or SOMETHING that is causing quantum laws to violate every law we have on the macro level. You can not accept the wavefunction collapse and then just hand-wave every problem this creates with everything else we know about physics, not when we have an interpretation out there that DOES NOT have those problems and is compatible both with all the math and the experiments to date. 




> MW looks to me


Yes, it looks to you. I'm glad you phrased it that way. It looks to you like this, BECAUSE YOU HAVE NO F'ING CLUE WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT. That we've gone several threads now without you presenting one argument against what MW is actually claiming is proof of this. Funnily enough, there actually ARE arguments to be made against MW. YOU DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT THOSE LEGITIMATE ARGUMENTS ARE!

----------


## MorpheusSandman

You know what, YesNo, just ignore the last post. I'm going to make this very simple and explain exactly what's being discussed here: 

Copenhagen: The wavefunction collapses on observation to a particle. CI conflicts with everything we know about macro physics: it is non-local, indeterministic, non-realism, conflicts with General Relativity, and assumes things like the backward flow of time. The only way to resolve these conflicts is to assume that there are hidden variables (ruled out by Bell's Thoerem), or some kind of split between micro/macro worlds, even though no split has been found. Now, to accept Copenhagen you have to come up with some plausible reason for why quantum laws and macro laws are in such conflict. Specifically, the fact that we have two different sets of laws for two levels implies that there is some "split" between these levels. In fact, that's the whole point of the wavefunction "collapse," that the wave "collapses" to the single world of deterministic particles that we experience. It's stating that this "collapse" is only happening at the micro levels, not the macro levels, and you need to explain why that is. What's more, why does the wavefunction collapse how it does? Why is it when you have a probability distribution does a wave suddenly become ONE thing rather than the OTHER? 

Many Worlds: It assumes one thing: QP works all the way down, ie, everything is obeying QP. This means that everything from the micro to macro level is in superposition. <- That is what MW is claiming. Those two claims are supported by every experiment done so far, meaning that increasingly large objects have been shown to be in superposition. If increasingly large objects are in superposition, THERE IS NO WAVEFUNCTION COLLAPSE, and if there is no collapse, you get many worlds. What's more, this interpretation works with everything else we know about physics. You don't have to explain why there is such a conflict between the micro and macro worlds. 

THAT is what we're dealing with. Now, you need to explain to me why Copenhagen is MORE LIKELY given what both are claiming and given the current state of the evidence. I don't want to hear anything about "metaphysics" or "choice" or "free-will" or "determinism," I want you to actually look at what both interps are claiming, look at the evidence, and explain to me why CI explains it better than MW. I will respond to nothing else from you except that.

----------


## YesNo

> Funnily enough, there actually ARE arguments to be made against MW. YOU DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT THOSE LEGITIMATE ARGUMENTS ARE!


I'll respond later today in more detail when I get time, but what are those legitimate arguments that you see against MW that I don't?

----------


## MorpheusSandman

> but what are those legitimate arguments that you see against MW that I don't?


All of the predictive power of QM comes from the Born Rule. These probabilities make sense in the framework of Copenhagen, but not in MW (or rather: MW can't derive them). Even MW proponents admit this is a serious problem, and there are various theories out there about it, but it's far from a settled issue. Yudkowsky details the problem as well as one possible solution here that was proposed by Robin Hanson here. Cioran may have some additional information about this.

----------


## YesNo

> All of the predictive power of QM comes from the Born Rule. These probabilities make sense in the framework of Copenhagen, but not in MW (or rather: MW can't derive them). Even MW proponents admit this is a serious problem, and there are various theories out there about it, but it's far from a settled issue. Yudkowsky details the problem as well as one possible solution here that was proposed by Robin Hanson here. Cioran may have some additional information about this.


Here are two sources taken from the Wikipedia article under "Probability" related to this issue: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation

1) Adrian Kent, "Against Many-Worlds Interpretations": http://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9703089v1.pdf

2) N.P. Landsman, "The Born rule and its interpretation": http://www.math.ru.nl/~landsman/Born.pdf

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## YesNo

> ...
> I asked you a question you did not answer: *what would make this distinguishable from us feeling like we make choices because we are ignorant of deterministic processes? How would we tell the difference?* It is not an extraordinary claim to say we are ignorant of deterministic processes. If I were to flip a coin, physics determines how it will land, but my finite brain cannot calculate the physics necessary to know how it will land, so my ignorance creates the 50/50 probability of the coin toss. Choices are similar; if I'm ignorant of the deterministic processes going on in my brain, then my feeling of "choice" would be identical to that ignorance. I feel a "choice" because I am "ignorant" of determinism is the same thing of the coin toss being 50/50 because I'm ignorant of the deterministic physics. This is not an extraordinary claim because it equally matches what we experience AND has support by the fact that we know we ARE ignorant of such processes outside our brains. 
> ...
> You experience the sun moving across the sky. You experience standing on a flat Earth. How is "free will" any different from those experiences?


It seems to me that Young Earth Creationists could make the same argument that you are making. They could claim that I am ignorant of some God who causes me to have as an illusion that the universe is 13.7 billion years old when it is actually only a few thousand years old. How would I tell the difference? 

Well, you tell the difference by the evidence.

The sun moves across the sky because the earth turns and evidence is provided for that explanation rather than the one that the sun is doing the moving. It is the evidence that counts.

It is true that what I experience could be an illusion, but until there is other evidence presented, I have to accept my own experience.

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## Calidore

> If I were to flip a coin, physics determines how it will land, but my finite brain cannot calculate the physics necessary to know how it will land, so my ignorance creates the 50/50 probability of the coin toss. Choices are similar; if I'm ignorant of the deterministic processes going on in my brain, then my feeling of "choice" would be identical to that ignorance. I feel a "choice" because I am "ignorant" of determinism is the same thing of the coin toss being 50/50 because I'm ignorant of the deterministic physics. This is not an extraordinary claim because it equally matches what we experience AND has support by the fact that we know we ARE ignorant of such processes outside our brains.


I'm afraid I don't get this one. The 50/50 probability doesn't come from our ignorance, it comes from the coin having two sides and only being able to land on one. Our inability to predict which side a coin will land on when flipped doesn't affect the 50/50 odds of it landing on either side in the slightest.

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## cafolini

Well, Voyager 1 reports that there is no change in the direction of the magnetic field.

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## mal4mac

> It seems to me that Young Earth Creationists could make the same argument that you are making. They could claim that I am ignorant of some God who causes me to have as an illusion that the universe is 13.7 billion years old when it is actually only a few thousand years old. How would I tell the difference? 
> 
> Well, you tell the difference by the evidence.
> 
> The sun moves across the sky because the earth turns and evidence is provided for that explanation rather than the one that the sun is doing the moving. It is the evidence that counts.
> 
> It is true that what I experience could be an illusion, but until there is other evidence presented, I have to accept my own experience.


There's actually a famous 19th century biologist, Gosse, the inventor of the aquarium, who believed that. He was leader of the Plymouth Brethren, *really* extreme fundamentalists, so had to believe that the earth was only a few thousand years old. But being an excellent biologist he couldn't discount Darwin's theory of evolution. So he had to believe that God had made it look like evolution had occurred. His son's book "Father & Son" is a great read.

So it's not only the evidence that counts, the circles you move in are likely have a great impact. Obviously he came under scathing attacks from Huxley et. al., but the Plymouth Brethren comforted him, and enabled him to maintain his strange position.

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## cacian

> Well, Voyager 1 reports that there is no change in the direction of the magnetic field.


isn't there? I thought magnetic field is because there is changes that is. there would not be magnetism without atmospheric movement/changes.

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## MorpheusSandman

> Here are two sources taken from the Wikipedia article under "Probability" related to this issue: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation
> 
> 1) Adrian Kent, "Against Many-Worlds Interpretations": http://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9703089v1.pdf
> 
> 2) N.P. Landsman, "The Born rule and its interpretation": http://www.math.ru.nl/~landsman/Born.pdf


The first paper was written in 1989. That's 24 years ago. I think you need to find something more recent than that would take in, you know, a quarter century worth of literature. The second is a more technical explanation of precisely what I stated regarding lack of a "generally accepted Born theory derivation to date" in MW, but even that paper states that this does not mean that such a derivation is impossible in principle. However, I think it's important to understand the difference between the two very different problems facing MWI and CI: CI can derive the Born rule, the axioms, at the expense of being compatible with everything else we know about physics; MWI cannot derive the Born rule, the axioms, but trades this for it being compatible with everything else we know about physics. Personally, I'm far more comfortable with the latter problem, which merely implies that there's something out there we don't know, as opposed to the former which essentially says "Oh, we know what's out there, even though what we know is inconsistent with everything else we know." To me, the latter problem is open to being solved, while I see no hope of the former being solved--not after almost 100 years of failed attempts at doing so. The latter could potentially be solved by technological advancements in quantum computing which is still in its infancy. 




> It seems to me that Young Earth Creationists could make the same argument that you are making. They could claim that I am ignorant of some God who causes me to have as an illusion that the universe is 13.7 billion years old when it is actually only a few thousand years old. How would I tell the difference? 
> 
> Well, you tell the difference by the evidence.
> 
> The sun moves across the sky because the earth turns and evidence is provided for that explanation rather than the one that the sun is doing the moving. It is the evidence that counts.


There's no analogy between "illusion of free-will = ignorance of determinism" (which I'll now abbreviate to IDIF (Ignorance of Determinism equals Illusive Free will)) and the YEC claim; the YEC is proposing an additional entity that exists objectively to explain what is already explainable and consistent without that entity. That's a direct violation of the Conjunction Fallacy (Occam's Razor). In comparison, IDIF is NOT proposing an additional external entity, but is merely proposing that something we know happens (our ignorance of determinism) leads to a feeling we know we feel (our feeling of making free-willed choices). If we know the former happens, and we know the latter happens, then you have to argue why the former cannot account for the latter. 

I already discussed this in a previous thread, essentially saying that a FEELING of free-will is only evidence of a feeling, not evidence for a 1:1 ontological derivation of that feeling (ie, feeling of free-will is not evidence for ontological free-will). We already have multiple examples of how our emotions, feelings, and even senses distort what is actually happening in reality. You just hand wave the "sun moving across the sky" as an example, but it illustrates an important point about how there are always hidden assumptions behind our feelings and senses being made. A feeling is evidence that a feeling exists, a sense is evidence that a sense exists; any ontological claims derived from those claims require something more than the feeling or sense by itself. That's partly why we have the scientific method: to eliminate the various biases and hidden assumptions we make that lead to incorrect conclusions.

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## MorpheusSandman

> I'm afraid I don't get this one. The 50/50 probability doesn't come from our ignorance,


Oh, yes it very much does: http://lesswrong.com/lw/oj/probability_is_in_the_mind/

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## Calidore

> Oh, yes it very much does: http://lesswrong.com/lw/oj/probability_is_in_the_mind/


Possibly I misunderstood. I thought you were talking about the probability of the coin landing on either side rather than the probability of one guessing which side it has landed on. All the argument and examples on that page seem to have to do with one's ability to guess an already-determined outcome rather than the physical probability of that outcome occurring in the first pace.

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## MorpheusSandman

> All the argument and examples on that page seem to have to do with one's ability to guess an already-determined outcome rather than the physical probability of that outcome occurring in the first pace.


I still think you're misunderstanding. The outcome of the coin-flip is deterministic in that it's determined by the power of the flip, distance to the ground, gravity, wind-currents, etc. If one could calculate all of these things and control them, it would not be 50/50 which side the coin landed on, it would be 100/0. It's our inability to account and control those factors (our ignorance) that makes the flip 50/50. The probability is a result of our epistemological finiteness, not the result of the process itself (the coin flip) being probabilistic. In fact, you can even understand WHY our epistemological limitation makes it 50/50, because the fact that there are only two sides the coin can land on is what we DO know and what we CAN account for. All of the other factors are out of our frame of available knowledge. Yudkowsky discusses this in detail with many examples. One pertaining to the coin flip: 


> To make the coinflip experiment repeatable, as frequentists are wont to demand, we could build an automated coinflipper, and verify that the results were 50% heads and 50% tails. But maybe a robot with extra-sensitive eyes and a good grasp of physics, watching the autoflipper prepare to flip, could predict the coin's fall in advancenot with certainty, but with 90% accuracy. Then what would the real probability be?
> 
> There is no "real probability". The robot has one state of partial information. You have a different state of partial information. The coin itself has no mind, and doesn't assign a probability to anything; it just flips into the air, rotates a few times, bounces off some air molecules, and lands either heads or tails.

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## YesNo

> The first paper was written in 1989. That's 24 years ago. I think you need to find something more recent than that would take in, you know, a quarter century worth of literature.


I am more interested in Kent's article. What it does is clarifies the challenge to MW that you and Yudkowski already agree exists. It is also cited currently in Wikipedia. What the 1989 date means to me is that MW has still not answered that challenge. 




> However, I think it's important to understand the difference between the two very different problems facing MWI and CI: CI can derive the Born rule, the axioms, at the expense of being compatible with everything else we know about physics; *MWI cannot derive the Born rule*, the axioms, but trades this for it being compatible with everything else we know about physics.


I agree with you that this is the situation. What this means is that CI is an interpretation for QM and MWI is not. This is the hand-waving part of MWI. It clams to be an interpretation, but it cannot generate those coefficients. 

MW is not an interpretation until it can derive those coefficients.




> Personally, I'm far more comfortable with the latter problem, which merely implies that there's something out there we don't know, as opposed to the former which essentially says "Oh, we know what's out there, even though what we know is inconsistent with everything else we know." To me, the latter problem is open to being solved, while I see no hope of the former being solved--not after almost 100 years of failed attempts at doing so. *The latter could potentially be solved by technological advancements in quantum computing which is still in its infancy.*


I think it is wishful thinking that Deutsch's program would prove anything one way or the other about MW. Here is Kent's comment on Deutsch:

Finally, we note that Deutsch’s main discussion involves thought experiments (Deutsch’s experiments 2 and 3) whose outcome is quite uncertain. Deutsch assumes that “quantum parallel processing” (which relies on pure hamiltonian evolution of the state vector) will occur during the operation of various computing devices. There is presently no compelling reason for this assumption. (Nor would we necessarily interpret the results Deutsch predicts as compelling evidence for MWI.)



> If we know the former happens, and we know the latter happens, then you have to argue why the former cannot account for the latter.


The problem is _we don't know_. These are all metaphysical assumptions for which one attempts to gather evidence. 




> I already discussed this in a previous thread, essentially saying that a FEELING of free-will is only evidence of a feeling, not evidence for a 1:1 ontological derivation of that feeling (ie, feeling of free-will is not evidence for ontological free-will). We already have multiple examples of how our emotions, feelings, and even senses distort what is actually happening in reality. You just hand wave the "sun moving across the sky" as an example, but it illustrates an important point about how there are always hidden assumptions behind our feelings and senses being made. A feeling is evidence that a feeling exists, a sense is evidence that a sense exists; *any ontological claims derived from those claims require something more than the feeling or sense by itself.* That's partly why we have the scientific method: to eliminate the various biases and hidden assumptions we make that lead to incorrect conclusions.


I agree with you that an ontological claim that something exists requires evidence, but so does an ontological claim that something does not exist require evidence. This is especially the case when there is evidence whether that is in the form of feelings or conclusions from other science that something does exist. 

There is no getting around the need to provide evidence.

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## MorpheusSandman

> What the 1989 date means to me is that MW has still not answered that challenge.


 :FRlol:  So a paper written in 1989 that ignores 24 years worth of literature on a subject means that it's the subject that "has still not answered that challenge?" Wow... Well, I might as well cite the very first papers on QM to show that it has still not answered the challenges of General Relativity! That said, I already agreed that MWI can't derive the Born Rule in a generally acceptable way, but this is not imputing the attempts out there being made. Someone could've already hit on the right answer, but that paper would have no idea as it hasn't covered any attempts in the last quarter century! 




> What this means is that CI is an interpretation for QM and MWI is not. This is the hand-waving part of MWI.


So... an interpretation that conflicts with everything else we know IS an interpretation that involves no hand-waving, but not an interpretation that DOESN'T conflict with everything else we know? I see. Seems to me that the interpretation that conflicts with everything we know would be the "interpretation" doing all the hand-waving. 




> I think it is wishful thinking that Deutsch's program would prove anything one way or the other about MW. Here is Kent's comment on Deutsch:


Yes, Kent's comments on Deutsch 24 years ago when quantum computing was a pipe dream, compared to now when it's already in its infancy. Find me a comment of him saying this in 2013 where quantum computing is a reality, which would be the "compelling reason" for Deutsch's "assumption." 




> The problem is _we don't know_.


Way to avoid all of my arguments. 




> I agree with you that an ontological claim that something exists requires evidence, but so does an ontological claim that something does not exist require evidence.


The ontological claims I'm making about free-will DO have evidence. We know we are ignorant of deterministic processes, we know the multitude of ways in which our feelings and senses delude us, and we know we "feel" that we make choices. There is no reason to assume the former (ignorance plus biases) are not responsible for the latter, especially when, one, it is a simpler explanation proposing no additional entities and is consistent with what we know, and, two, we already have examples of how something similar works with probability (ie, ignorance of determinism leading to uncertainty).

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## YesNo

> So a paper written in 1989 that ignores 24 years worth of literature on a subject means that it's the subject that "has still not answered that challenge?" Wow... Well, I might as well cite the very first papers on QM to show that it has still not answered the challenges of General Relativity! That said, I already agreed that MWI can't derive the Born Rule in a generally acceptable way, but this is not imputing the attempts out there being made. Someone could've already hit on the right answer, but that paper would have no idea as it hasn't covered any attempts in the last quarter century!


I would like to see a paper address more current work, if any exists, but this is what Wikipedia is currently referencing. Since I didn't see a solution to the problem on Wikipedia, I assume it has not yet been solved. 

If you know of any other reference, please cite it.




> So... an interpretation that conflicts with everything else we know IS an interpretation that involves no hand-waving, but not an interpretation that DOESN'T conflict with everything else we know? I see. Seems to me that the interpretation that conflicts with everything we know would be the "interpretation" doing all the hand-waving.


It is not a choice between CI and MWI. There are a lot of interpretations to choose from, but MWI cannot be an interpretation if it doesn't generate those coefficients. 

This should make MWI questionable even for its supporters. How do they know it delivers what it promises? As an ideology justifying a metaphysics, it is fine. I don't expect such a metaphysics to come up with anything better since I don't think the underlying metaphysics is true.




> Yes, Kent's comments on Deutsch 24 years ago when quantum computing was a pipe dream, compared to now when it's already in its infancy. Find me a comment of him saying this in 2013 where quantum computing is a reality, which would be the "compelling reason" for Deutsch's "assumption."


Do you have a more recent reference? I recall getting the same impression about Deutsch from reading _Fabric of Reality_ that Kent did. Essentially Deutsch presents a process within our world that he claims justifies the existence of many worlds. To me it is all a claim, nothing more.




> Way to avoid all of my arguments. 
> 
> The ontological claims I'm making about free-will DO have evidence. We know we are ignorant of deterministic processes, we know the multitude of ways in which our feelings and senses delude us, and we know we "feel" that we make choices. There is no reason to assume the former (ignorance plus biases) are not responsible for the latter, especially when, one, it is a simpler explanation proposing no additional entities and is consistent with what we know, and, two, we already have examples of how something similar works with probability (ie, ignorance of determinism leading to uncertainty).


What you are arguing is that I could be ignorant of what I think is true or what I experience could be an illusion. I am not doubting that. The same applies to your position. What I am doubting is that this particular alternative, determinism, that you are promoting is itself anything more than an illusion. It sounds to me like an obsolete metaphysics that is trying to promote itself without evidence.

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## Calidore

> The outcome of the coin-flip is deterministic in that it's determined by the power of the flip, distance to the ground, gravity, wind-currents, etc.


True.




> If one could calculate all of these things and control them, it would not be 50/50 which side the coin landed on, it would be 100/0.


True as an "if" statement, but as the if isn't applicable, since we can't, the statement is irrelevant. And anyway...




> It's our inability to account and control those factors (our ignorance) that makes the flip 50/50. The probability is a result of our epistemological finiteness, not the result of the process itself (the coin flip) being probabilistic.


This isn't true. The coin has two sides and will land on one. Base chance 50/50. In fact, "it's our inability to account and control those factors (our ignorance) that" prevents us from making the odds anything other than 50/50. Not the same thing.




> To make the coinflip experiment repeatable, as frequentists are wont to demand, we could build an automated coinflipper, and verify that the results were 50% heads and 50% tails. But maybe a robot with extra-sensitive eyes and a good grasp of physics, watching the autoflipper prepare to flip, could predict the coin's fall in advancenot with certainty, but with 90% accuracy. Then what would the real probability be?


Another "if", and here's he's talking about predicting, rather than affecting, an admitted 50/50 outcome.




> The coin itself has no mind, and doesn't assign a probability to anything; it just flips into the air, rotates a few times, bounces off some air molecules, and lands either heads or tails.


Yes.

The other examples on that page (the kids and the cards) also are talking about the changing odds of correctly guessing the answer (number of boys, number of aces) based on adding to the information you have, not the odds of her having that number of boys or the cardholder having that number of aces in the first place.

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## MorpheusSandman

> I There are a lot of interpretations to choose from,


The two major choices are collapse VS decoherence; there are several variations on those two basic camps. All decoherence models that I know involve some version of MW (Many Histories, eg), because that's what it is. 




> MWI cannot be an interpretation if it doesn't generate those coefficients.
> 
> This should make MWI questionable even for its supporters. How do they know it delivers what it promises?


The first statement is just nonsense; by that token I can claim CI cannot be an interpretation because it conflicts with every other model of physics and simply assumes the existence of something (the collapse) for which there is no evidence for assuming. In a way, the two interpretations presents the two sides of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems about the inability of mathematical models to be both complete and consistent. CI is complete but inconsistent; MW is incomplete but consistent. I take consistency over completeness as all the lack of completeness implies is that there's something we don't know; inconsistency, however, implies we don't know what we know, which is oxymoronic. 

MW _is_ questionable to its supporters, including myself. That something is questionable has no bearing on whether or not it's better than other alternatives. Look at Yudkowsky's page on the Born Rule; he reviews the solution offered by Hanson and gives it "less than a 50% probability of being true," but then states that that probability would be less if there was any other explanation that was even remotely as reductive and mathematically elegant. IE, stating that one model is the best out there is not tantamount to saying it's perfect and has no problems or, indeed, even that it has a better than a 50/50 probability of being true. 

Similarly, MW proponents do not deny it has problems, but what we claim is that those problems are lesser than those of CI. Post after post you've blatantly ignored the seemingly insurmountable problems with CI and have spent most of your time picking problems with MW that aren't even problems. The Born Rule is a problem; not an insurmountable one, but a significant one. I find that problem less significant than those by CI. It's like one is staring at a dam; MW has a good-sized crack that needs to be attended to, while CI is completely crumbling. Sure, they're both problems, but not even remotely in the same ballpark. 




> Do you have a more recent reference?


No, but I'm pretty sure Cioran would. 




> What you are arguing is that I could be ignorant of what I think is true or what I experience could be an illusion. I am not doubting that. The same applies to your position.


Errr, that sounds like a garbled mess. Even if you take CI to be true then you have to believe that our world is deterministic on the macro level, because CI creates a split between the "indeterminstic" world of particles and the "deterministic" world of Einstein's GR. So even under CI it would be true that we are ignorant of certain deterministic processes and that this ignorance creates the appearance of probability; so why would "choice" not be the same thing? I'm not saying we COULD be ignorant of something, I'm saying we demonstrably ARE ignorant of certain deterministic processes, and drawing an inference between the probability that ignorance creates and the feeling of choice it would similarly create for us. You have to show why that inference is not valid.

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## MorpheusSandman

> This isn't true. The coin has two sides and will land on one. Base chance 50/50. In fact, "it's our inability to account and control those factors (our ignorance) that" prevents us from making the odds anything other than 50/50. Not the same thing... Another "if", and here's he's talking about predicting, rather than affecting, an admitted 50/50 outcome.


I'm not entirely sure with what you're having problem with here. You say "base chance 50/50," and this is just incorrect. The two sides of the coin are one factor in what side it will land on. All of the other elements I listed (force of flip, gravity, etc.) are just as much factors. Because we do not know them, we do not consider them. That doesn't mean they don't affect the probability of what side the coin will land on. Similarly, if the robot CAN take into consideration all of these factors and can guess what side the coin will land on with 90% accuracy, what makes you think the probability of it landing on either side is still 50/50? I don't know what you mean it's about "predicting not affecting," because all of those other factors (force of flip, etc.) are what EFFECTS (not AFFECTS) the outcome, and if you CAN take those into consideration like the robot, then the probability changes. What's changing, however, is one's level of knowledge about the deterministic processes. The coins' two sides are still a part of this, but now it no longer rules our (well, the robot's) probability assignment because it/we can factor in the other elements. Let me give three illustrative examples: 

1. You are told a coin is loaded and that it will land on one side 80% of the time. You are not told what side it is. What is the probability of the coin landing on heads? 
2. Same scenario, but now you are told it will land on heads 80% of the time. What's the probability it will land on heads? 
3. Same scenario, but now you're a superhuman who can, as soon as the coin is flipped, instantly calculate all of the physics involved, and you know it will land on tails 100% of the time this flip. What is the probability it will land on heads? 

The correct answer to 1. is 50%, the obvious answer to 2. is 80%, and the equally obvious answer to 3. is 0%. The only thing that changes in these three scenarios is our knowledge, not the coin or process itself. The coin is always going to land on tails that flip. Whether we assign the probability of it landing on heads as 50%, 80%, or 0% all depends on our knowledge about the coin and physics. That's what's meant by probability being in the mind.

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## YesNo

> The two major choices are collapse VS decoherence; there are several variations on those two basic camps. All decoherence models that I know involve some version of MW (Many Histories, eg), because that's what it is.


Roland Omnes helped create decoherence theory, but he would be considered opposed to MW. The issue is not as simple as collapse vs decoherence. Feynman's many histories assumes the quantum stuff he wants to measure takes all possible routes and from there he calculates the probabilities. I see this as more of an alternate technique for calculation. This is not MW. CI, as I understand it, claims there are no values for the attributes being measured until they are measured.

I will admit the CI claim is hard to even understand, but it fits the quantum facts and basically throws them back in our faces. We expect there to be a reason why this electron, for example, the same as any other electron, is at some position and not another, but there isn't. If I understand CI correctly, it claims the electron has no position prior to measurement. That's the peculiarity of this interpretation. It is as if the electron makes a free choice, within the bounds of certain constraints, where it is. That choice is made at the moment of measurement. Prior to the measurement it was not at that position. It had no position attribute at all.




> The first statement is just nonsense; by that token I can claim CI cannot be an interpretation because it conflicts with every other model of physics and simply assumes the existence of something (the collapse) for which there is no evidence for assuming.


CI is an interpretation for QM. It is not an interpretation for past physics. MW looks like an attempt to create an interpretation of QM so that it fits with past physics. Since MW cannot come up with the Born rule coefficients, it is not even an interpretation of QM.

I think the issue with collapse is more related to von Neumann's interpretation. 




> In a way, the two interpretations presents the two sides of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems about the inability of mathematical models to be both complete and consistent. CI is complete but inconsistent; MW is incomplete but consistent.


I don't think it has anything to do with Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. It is a more straightforward problem. 

MW drops the assumption of collapse. Now it can brag that is its better than CI because it has one less axiom. However, because of dropping that axiom it can no longer generate the coefficients. It is more like dropping the 5th parallel postulate in Euclid's geometry. Now Euclidean geometry has one less axiom, but it can say nothing of value about parallel lines.




> Similarly, MW proponents do not deny it has problems, but what we claim is that those problems are lesser than those of CI. Post after post you've blatantly ignored the seemingly insurmountable problems with CI and have spent most of your time picking problems with MW that aren't even problems. The Born Rule is a problem; not an insurmountable one, but a significant one. I find that problem less significant than those by CI. It's like one is staring at a dam; MW has a good-sized crack that needs to be attended to, while CI is completely crumbling. Sure, they're both problems, but not even remotely in the same ballpark.


I think the problem that you are having with CI is that it fits the quantum facts, but what it says about those facts is unacceptable. The problem with MW is that it does not fit the quantum facts, but it says what you want it to say. 

It seems like it is more the quantum facts that are the problem.




> Errr, that sounds like a garbled mess. Even if you take CI to be true then you have to believe that our world is deterministic on the macro level, because CI creates a split between the "indeterminstic" world of particles and the "deterministic" world of Einstein's GR. So even under CI it would be true that we are ignorant of certain deterministic processes and that this ignorance creates the appearance of probability; so why would "choice" not be the same thing? I'm not saying we COULD be ignorant of something, I'm saying we demonstrably ARE ignorant of certain deterministic processes, and drawing an inference between the probability that ignorance creates and the feeling of choice it would similarly create for us. *You have to show why that inference is not valid.*


I don't have to believe the world is deterministic because you believe that it is. That is why the claims you are making are not valid.

You are making an assumption that there is no possibility of any of us making a choice whatsoever. When confronted with my claim that we do make choices, and the evidence of my senses that they are choices, you counter with my supposed ignorance of deterministic processes. You claim "we demonstrably ARE ignorant", but _you provide no evidence_. 

I agree that such a claim follows from your metaphysics, but your metaphysics is not my metaphysics and you have not provided me with either evidence or an adequate reason to switch metaphysics except that that is what you believe.

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## Calidore

I think the source of our disconnect is here:




> if the robot CAN take into consideration all of these factors and can guess what side the coin will land on with 90% accuracy, what makes you think the probability of it landing on either side is still 50/50?


You seem to be equating the probability of correctly predicting which side the coin will land on with the actual physical odds of it landing on that side, while I'm saying they're two different things. For example, in your first loaded-coin scenario, you give the probability of the coin landing on heads as 50%, even though the coin is biased 80/20 in favor of an unknown side. I agree that, since the loaded side is unknown, the odds of _choosing_ the correct side are still 50%, but the actual odds of it landing on heads are either 80% or 20%, depending on which side is loaded.

I'm also seeing a seeming contradiction between your answer here and something you said further up: In both cases, the side that's loaded and the the side that the robot is predicting are not specified, but you give an answer of 50% for the loaded coin and say "what makes you think the probability of it landing on either side is still 50/50?" for the robot example. Am I missing something?

Moving on to #2, we agree on this one. We know the coin will land on heads 80% of the time, thus the smart thing to do would be to guess heads, which will be right 80% of the time. Easy.

#3 is more interesting to me because it goes back to what I said above about you equating advance knowledge of a result with the odds of that result occurring.

With this established, I'm seeing the potential for an infinite conversation loop. 




> You say "base chance 50/50," and this is just incorrect.


And this is why I'm not sure we'll be able to connect. Two equally possible outcomes (assuming no loading, robots, or superpowers) with one possible result = 50/50. A "scientific" belief system that requires claiming otherwise is just bizarre to me.

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## MorpheusSandman

> The issue is not as simple as collapse vs decoherence.


Those are the two basic approaches to the wavefunction issue. Of course there are many variations. 




> I will admit the CI claim is hard to even understand, but it fits the quantum facts and basically throws them back in our faces. We expect there to be a reason why this electron, for example, the same as any other electron, is at some position and not another, but there isn't. If I understand CI correctly, it claims the electron has no position prior to measurement. That's the peculiarity of this interpretation. It is as if the electron makes a free choice, within the bounds of certain constraints, where it is. That choice is made at the moment of measurement. Prior to the measurement it was not at that position. It had no position attribute at all.


Even the way you describe it makes CI out to be no better than magic: why is an electron here instead of there! I dunno! Magic! Goddidit! Consciousdidit! or What are electrons before measurement? I dunno! Magic! The problem with the latter is that if particles werent real entities before measurement then we shouldnt be able to make certain predictions, yet we do. Cioran was explaining this in the last thread on the subject. How in the world can a particle make a choice? You stating that prior to the measurement it had no possitional attribute is just one of the many baseless assumptions of CI that makes no sense if you stop to think about it even for a second. 




> CI is an interpretation for QM. It is not an interpretation for past physics. MW looks like an attempt to create an interpretation of QM so that it fits with past physics. Since MW cannot come up with the Born rule coefficients, it is not even an interpretation of QM.


The whole Ci is just an interp for QM, not past physics is REALLY what hand-waving look likes. The issue is WHY is this model of QM not compatible with past physics that have not been disproved or replaced with a different/better model? Whats more, at what point does the world STOP working according to past physics and START working via QM, which would explain why they are mutually incompatible? You cant point to that place; nobody can. Either it doesnt exist, in which MW (or at least decoherence) is right, or its somewhere that nobody has found yet. 

MW not being able to derive the Born rule makes it not a theory, not not an interpretation. CI can only derive the Born rule because it assumes the collapse, and the collapse is not part of any mathematical fact of QM; it's just an assumption. 




> I don't think it has anything to do with Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. It is a more straightforward problem. 
> 
> MW drops the assumption of collapse. Now it can brag that is its better than CI because it has one less axiom. However, because of dropping that axiom it can no longer generate the coefficients.


You didnt really argue why the analogy is invalid. MW not being able to generate the Born rule makes it consistent but incomplete; CI being able to generate the Born rule makes it complete but inconsistent. Thats Godels Incompleteness Theorem right there. MW being simpler in addition to it being consistent is just one more reason to prefer it. 




> I think the problem that you are having with CI is that it fits the quantum facts, but what it says about those facts is unacceptable. The problem with MW is that it does not fit the quantum facts, but it says what you want it to say.


The Flying Spaghetti Monster fits the facts of evolution. Its easy to come up with something that fits the facts. Thats not an argument for how to choose between different interpretations/models. Whats unacceptable about CI is NOT that it fits the facts of QM, its that it doesnt fit the facts of classic physics _for no discernible reason._ If someone could explain WHY there is a need for two different models for two different levels of physics that are mutually incompatible then that would be one thing, but nobody can explain it. MW DOES fit the quantum facts (and, whats more, fits the facts of classic physics); that it cant derive the Born rule doesnt mean it doesnt fit the facts; it wouldnt fit the facts If MW contradicted the Born Ruleit doesnt do this. 




> I don't have to believe the world is deterministic because you believe that it is.


You dont get it. The entire point of CI is that the collapse creates a split between the indeterministic world of QM and the deterministic world of GR. So you cant escape determinism _on some level_ even with CI. This is not some option/choice you can make, this is what CI actually is. Unless, of course, you dont think GR is deterministic 




> You are making an assumption that there is no possibility of any of us making a choice whatsoever. When confronted with my claim that we do make choices, and the evidence of my senses that they are choices, you counter with my supposed ignorance of deterministic processes. You claim "we demonstrably ARE ignorant", but _you provide no evidence_.


Youre still completely garbling the points being made. 

1. Ontological (actual) Free Will would be experientially identical to our ignorance of determinism. 
2. We are ignorant of some deterministic processes; see my posts to Callidore about how our ignorance of physics creates the 50/50 probability of a coin-flip. 
3. You cannot use CI to escape determinism, because CI does not displace the determinism of classical physics, all it does is create a different model for QM that is incompatible with classical physics. For it to replace classical physics it would have to be consistent with our (extremely accurate) models of classical physics. 
4. Given 3., you must admit either that determinism is applicable on the macro level, or claim that theres something about QM we dont know that would extend that indeterministic world to the classic level, and you have no scientific base for claiming the latter. 
5. Given 3. and 4., you must show how our demonstrable ignorance of deterministic processes could not create the illusion of choices/free-will. 
6. Absenting 5., youd have to argue why it would be better to assume ontological free-will than it would be to assume ignorance of determinism given that we know the latter happens.

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## MorpheusSandman

Callidore, I think this should probably be my last attempt at explaining this. I tackle it from every angle I know to, and try to repeat a lot of the central points for emphasis. I understand how this can be counter-intuitive, but you have to understand that the human brain is wired to project itself onto reality, and that issues like this are where we have to learn to "disconnect" our fallacious intuitions and understand that that what we think/know/believe isn't necessarily identical to what's out there. A good primer would be The Map is Not the Territory, which tries to distinguish between reality and what we know/don't know/believe about reality. 




> I think the source of our disconnect is here:


What it seems to me like you're doing is you're abstracting one fact about the coin (its two sides) from the process of the actual flip (force, gravity, distance, etc.) and considering them as two different things. I don't know why you're doing this. The two sides of the coin in combination with the physics of the flip determine what side the coin will land on 100% of the time. If one could calculate all of these things, the odds would not be 50/50, but 100/0. That we can't (typically) account for those things makes it 50/50, because all we DO know is that there are two possibilities we can take into account. This is a statement about OUR KNOWLEDGE of the process, NOT a statement about the process itself. 




> You seem to be equating the probability of correctly predicting which side the coin will land on with the actual physical odds of it landing on that side, while I'm saying they're two different things.


You're right that they're two different things. The physical odds of the coin landing on the side it does is 100/0, if you factor in every physical fact including force, gravity, distance, and the two sides of the coin _together_. Let me repeat for emphasis: THE PHYSICAL ODDS OF THE COIN LANDING ON THE SIDE IT LANDS ON IS ALWAYS 100/0. The odds only BECOME 50/50 because we cannot take into account the physics, all we can account for is the coins' two sides. The probability is created by our knowledge and ignorance of the physical facts, not by the physical facts themselves. 




> I agree that, since the loaded side is unknown, the odds of _choosing_ the correct side are still 50%, but the actual odds of it landing on heads are either 80% or 20%, depending on which side is loaded.


Correct on the first statement, but the second statement: "the actual odds of it landing on heads are either 80% or 20%" is what Yudkowsky described as the frequentist interpretation, and then argued why that interpretation is incorrect. Because, eg, if you are a superhuman and can calculate all of the other physical factors (force, gravity, etc.) and know that it will always land on tails that flip, then the probability is NOT 80/20, but rather 100/0. The fact that the probabilities change depending on our knowledge of the physical facts shows that probability is a statement about our knowledge/ignorance of reality, not reality itself. 




> I'm also seeing a seeming contradiction between your answer here and something you said further up: In both cases, the side that's loaded and the the side that the robot is predicting are not specified, but you give an answer of 50% for the loaded coin and say "what makes you think the probability of it landing on either side is still 50/50?" for the robot example. Am I missing something?


No contradiction, what I'm stating is that the probability we assign is completely dependent on our knowledge. If we know the coin is loaded but don't know what side is loaded we assign it 50/50. If we know what side is loaded we assign that side 80/20. If we know what side is loaded and can calculate all the physical processes, then we assign the side it will land on 100/0. In every case the probability is created by our knowledge regarding the flip, not the flip itself. When I asked "what makes you think the probability would still be 50/50?" was in response to the robot being able to take into account all of the physical processes and predict the results of the flip with 90% accuracy. Put another way, if the robot can predict the flip with 90% accuracy, would you take a bet where you laid $1 to $3 that the robot's prediction was right? If the probability was ACTUALLY 50/50 you'd lose (over time) making this bet, but if the robot's prediction is 90% accurate, you'd win (over time) making this bet. How can this be if the odds are ACTUALLY 50/50? 




> #3 is more interesting to me because it goes back to what I said above about you equating advance knowledge of a result with the odds of that result occurring.


If you have advanced knowledge of the result, what makes you think the odds of that event occurring are anything other than 100/0? However, what I'm describing isn't "advanced knowledge," but rather the ability to take in other factors that effect the result (force, gravity, distance, etc.). It seems to me that your mistake is abstracting one piece of knowledge about the coin (the two sides) from all the other processes that determine what side the coin lands on during the flip. 




> Two equally possible outcomes (assuming no loading, robots, or superpowers) with one possible result = 50/50.


The two outcomes are only equally likely if one is ignorant of all the physical facts. If one is not ignorant of the physical facts the outcomes are not equally likely. 




> A "scientific" belief system that requires claiming otherwise is just bizarre to me.


It's not a "belief system." It seems bizarre to you because people often have great difficult with understanding that their ignorance is a statement about themselves, not about reality. If you are ignorant of the deterministic processes of a coin-flip, this does not mean that the process is actually indeterministic, that the odds are actually 50/50 what side it lands on. The odds it lands on the side it does is 100/0 taking into account the physical processes. It's only 50/50 when we can't take into account the physical processes. The 50/50 reflects our state of knowledge and ignorance, not the state of the flip itself. 

Yudkowsky compares this to the classic Map-Territory relation, where the map is our knowledge/beliefs about reality and the territory is reality itself. If there's a blank spot on a map--our ignorance--then that doesn't mean that there's nothing at that spot in the actual territory; ie, if we don't know something about reality (the physics involved in a coin-flip), then that doesn't mean that the process is 50/50 and indeterministic. Your entire problem is that you're mistaking a statement about our knowledge (probability, the 50/50 flip) with a statement about reality.

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## YesNo

> Even the way you describe it makes CI out to be no better than magic: why is an electron here instead of there! I dunno! Magic! Goddidit! Consciousdidit! or What are electrons before measurement? I dunno! Magic! The problem with the latter is that if particles werent real entities before measurement then we shouldnt be able to make certain predictions, yet we do. Cioran was explaining this in the last thread on the subject. How in the world can a particle make a choice? You stating that prior to the measurement it had no possitional attribute is just one of the many baseless assumptions of CI that makes no sense if you stop to think about it even for a second.


I deliberately called what the electron does as making a choice to emphasize the problem. If an electron can make a choice, it would have to be conscious in some way. 

The interpretations try to avoid going down that path of the electron making a choice by either not saying anything more about it (CI) or coming up with some sort of collapse (von Neumann) or saying the measuring instruments are causing the disturbance. Or in the MW case, claiming that every possibility is magically realized. 




> The whole Ci is just an interp for QM, not past physics is REALLY what hand-waving look likes. The issue is WHY is this model of QM not compatible with past physics that have not been disproved or replaced with a different/better model? Whats more, at what point does the world STOP working according to past physics and START working via QM, which would explain why they are mutually incompatible? You cant point to that place; nobody can. Either it doesnt exist, in which MW (or at least decoherence) is right, or its somewhere that nobody has found yet.


The reason QM is not compatible with past physics is because of the quantum facts, the evidence, that invalidate the past physics and leave it as an approximation only. My view is that the whole world works according to QM.




> You didnt really argue why the analogy is invalid. MW not being able to generate the Born rule makes it consistent but incomplete; CI being able to generate the Born rule makes it complete but inconsistent. Thats Godels Incompleteness Theorem right there. MW being simpler in addition to it being consistent is just one more reason to prefer it.


Godel's incompleteness theorem showed that if you assume you have a supposedly complete theory of arithmetic, you can generate from that theory a legitimate theorem that cannot be proved in that theory leading to a contradiction. So the theory is not complete as assumed.

In the case of MW we are talking about five axioms, not a whole theory. From these five axioms MW cannot show how to generate the probabilities because in its view everything happens. And yet, we need those probabilities to use QM. So we are at a level of axioms not able to explain the facts, and yet with adherents claiming we should accept those axioms anyway. 

That is why the analogy with Euclid fits the situation better.




> The Flying Spaghetti Monster fits the facts of evolution. Its easy to come up with something that fits the facts. Thats not an argument for how to choose between different interpretations/models. Whats unacceptable about CI is NOT that it fits the facts of QM, its that it doesnt fit the facts of classic physics _for no discernible reason._ If someone could explain WHY there is a need for two different models for two different levels of physics that are mutually incompatible then that would be one thing, but nobody can explain it. MW DOES fit the quantum facts (and, whats more, fits the facts of classic physics); that it cant derive the Born rule doesnt mean it doesnt fit the facts; it wouldnt fit the facts If MW contradicted the Born Ruleit doesnt do this.


It is all QM. Classical physics is just an approximation. The reason is because of the quantum facts that experimenters have observed and QM has explained. 




> You dont get it. The entire point of CI is that the collapse creates a split between the indeterministic world of QM and the deterministic world of GR. So you cant escape determinism _on some level_ even with CI. This is not some option/choice you can make, this is what CI actually is. Unless, of course, you dont think GR is deterministic


I don't think it is so much about the collapse or decoherence, which focuses attention on the measurement, as the quantum fact that the electron can be modeled as making a choice. One goes to the measurement to try to find some way to explain why the electron is not making a choice. 

With Bell's theorem and empirical evidence supporting it, the electron is also non-local, which messes with relativity.

As far as "escaping determinism", given QM, the problem is how much pseudo-determinism actually remains.




> 1. Ontological (actual) Free Will would be experientially identical to our ignorance of determinism.


I'll accept that. Also, our ignorance of ontological indeterminism could look like determinism.




> 2. We are ignorant of some deterministic processes; see my posts to Callidore about how our ignorance of physics creates the 50/50 probability of a coin-flip.


I'll accept that, although I think in your exchange with Calidore you are assuming that the world is deterministic. It is not. 

There are two perspectives to consider:

1) Using classical physics, the robot will not be able to calculate all the forces accurately enough to give a deterministic result all the time. However, that can be attributed to the ignorance of the forces that you mentioned. That supposed ignorance allows you to keep your "map" or metaphysics intact. It is possible that the world actually is indeterministic.

2) Using QM, even a supernatural agent, with complete knowledge of all that can be known, cannot know what will happen because those facts do not exist. This overrides any determinism. It shows that what we are ignorant of, from the classical position, is the indeterminism. With QM, it is not an _ignorance_ of the deterministic forces anymore. The accurate knowledge required for determinism, does not exist.




> 3. You cannot use CI to escape determinism, because CI does not displace the determinism of classical physics, all it does is create a different model for QM that is incompatible with classical physics. For it to replace classical physics it would have to be consistent with our (extremely accurate) models of classical physics.


Classical physics is over except as an approximation. So, any determinism that was part of classical physics, its "map" or metaphysics, is no longer relevant. Classical physics is only as accurate as we can make measurements. Even its "constants" may not be constant at a certain level of accuracy.

So, I don't accept this.




> 4. Given 3., you must admit either that determinism is applicable on the macro level, or claim that theres something about QM we dont know that would extend that indeterministic world to the classic level, and you have no scientific base for claiming the latter.


I don't have to admit that, nor do I have to claim that QM is missing some hidden variable. Determinism is an old "map" for a reality, "territory", that has been shown by quantum facts to be far different from what that deterministic map said they were. You need to get a new map that fits the territory better.

The indeterminism can be viewed in our choices, and since we know we are conscious, we can legitimately talk about these as choices. The indeterminism can also be seen in the measurements of quantum stuff.




> 5. Given 3. and 4., you must show how our demonstrable ignorance of deterministic processes could not create the illusion of choices/free-will.


Are you claiming that because illusions exist then everything is an illusion? If so, that's a fallacy.

This is your extraordinary claim, not mine. You need to provide evidence that there is no possibility of free choice, none whatsoever, in spite of the evidence of QM, in spite of the evidence of our own experience. It is not enough to repeat metaphysical dogmas. Evidence is required. 




> 6. Absenting 5., youd have to argue why it would be better to assume ontological free-will than it would be to assume ignorance of determinism given that we know the latter happens.


Actually, i don't have to do anything. You are the one claiming that my experience is an illusion. You need to provide evidence that you are right. So far, you have not provided any.

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## cafolini

The only relativity that has worked in 99.999...% of cases and is responsible for 99.999...% of evolution in technology, including the abuse of the use of the technology that stupidly aspires to deny it, is Galilean relativity, pioneered by Newton and proven to work beyond the shadow of a doubt in what can be done. QM is an interpretation that has neither proof of indeterminism nor determinism, except in the idiocy of philo-sophist babbling. You people should study Faraday, Bernoulli, Ohm, Plank, Tesla. But you people cannot ever even grasp the Books of Euclid and Archimedes.

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## mal4mac

Newtonian cosmology is actually a highly respected model, adequate for many purposes, especially if the flat model of cosmology is correct (as latest observations indicate). One thing it makes easy is intuition & visualisation, you can think of the universe as starting with a big bang exploding into 3D space, and not go far wrong. It's at least as good as the old balloon model of the big bang... and the maths is quite simple:

http://www.ast.cam.ac.uk/~pettini/Ph.../lecture02.pdf

Unfortunately (?), though, SR and GR are necessary to explain some things... those 0.001% of cases are important!

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## cafolini

> Newtonian cosmology is actually a highly respected model, adequate for many purposes, especially if the flat model of cosmology is correct (as latest observations indicate). One thing it makes easy is intuition & visualisation, you can think of the universe as starting with a big bang exploding into 3D space, and not go far wrong. It's at least as good as the old balloon model of the big bang... and the maths is quite simple:
> 
> http://www.ast.cam.ac.uk/~pettini/Ph.../lecture02.pdf
> 
> Unfortunately (?), though, SR and GR are necessary to explain some things... those 0.001% of cases are important!


There is no such thing as Newtonian cosmology. But there are Cosmicomics, and Numbers in the Dark.

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## MorpheusSandman

> The interpretations try to avoid going down that path of the electron making a choice by either not saying anything more about it (CI) or coming up with some sort of collapse (von Neumann) or saying the measuring instruments are causing the disturbance. Or in the MW case, claiming that every possibility is magically realized.


The interpretations avoid going down that path because how in the world would you move toward proving it or even arguing for it? We dont even fully understand how a brain/consciousness makes decisions, and we only know about it all because countless particles are making up the matter of a brain. How can a non-brain make a decision? How could you show that it did? Theres nothing magical about MW; no collapse equals decoherence equals MW, and this is consistent with what weve tested by placing larger objects in superposition. Its CI thats invoking magic (God, consciousness, etc.) to explain how particles behave how they do. 




> The reason QM is not compatible with past physics is because of the quantum facts, the evidence, that invalidate the past physics and leave it as an approximation only. My view is that the whole world works according to QM.


Doesnt work like that because once the wavefunction collapses to a particle, and once you get the bending/stretching of spacetime by gravity, GR is perfectly accurate. Conversely, QM runs into problem when relativistic effects exist, and you end up with contradictions. If the whole world works according to QM then that would be MW, not CI, because classical physics has no wavefunction collapse and the only way to apply QM to larger objects is to assume everything is in a state of superposition, which would give you MW since theres no collapse. 

Of course, you may say that classical physics is an approximation because QM is more accurate, though this is debatable; GR has withstood every test weve thrown at it and so has QM, so its a bit strange to talk about one being more accurate when both work with 100% consistency within their contexts. Perhaps QM gives you more accurate results at farther decimal places, but GR gives accurate results for as far as its testing decimal places can stretch. That implies the limitations of our testing, not the models. 

However, never has an approximation been contradicted by the more accurate model. IE, when Newtonian physics was replaced by GR, the two were still compatible; GR merely took into account more factors than NP and subsumed NP under its paradigm. IE, it explained more, it didnt contradict. You could say the same thing about Darwinian evolution VS modern evolution: a refinement and subsumation, not a contradiction. 

CI would be the very first time in the history of science that a new theory contradicted an approximation. MW, on the other hand, is a subsumation/refinement in the exact same way GR is a subsumation/refinement of NP. MW fits what we knows about how more accurate models subsume/refine older models, CI does not (yet another reason to prefer MW). 




> Godel's incompleteness theorem showed that if you assume you have a supposedly complete theory of arithmetic, you can generate from that theory a legitimate theorem that cannot be proved in that theory leading to a contradiction. So the theory is not complete as assumed.
> 
> In the case of MW we are talking about five axioms, not a whole theory. From these five axioms MW cannot show how to generate the probabilities because in its view everything happens. And yet, we need those probabilities to use QM. So we are at a level of axioms not able to explain the facts, and yet with adherents claiming we should accept those axioms anyway.


Obviously the analogy doesnt work perfectly because in the case of CI/MW were dealing with interpretations rather than mathematical theorems, but I still dont think anything youve said has invalidated the metaphor (except if you read it literally, in which case you could do that with all metaphors). You can view CI as being complete, yet its completeness contradicts everything else we know about physics. Sorry, you cannot explain this away by saying past physics was an approximation because approximations arent contradicted by theories that are more comprehensive, they get refined ala GR/NP, or modern evolution/Darwinian evolution. In that sense, MW is consistent with what we know, yet incomplete because it has to assume the Born probabilities without (yet) being able to prove them. Yes, this analogous, not literal. 




> With Bell's theorem and empirical evidence supporting it, the electron is also non-local, which messes with relativity.


Right, and how do you explain this? How do particles affect each other at great distances many times faster than the speed of light? Magic? 




> As far as "escaping determinism", given QM, the problem is how much pseudo-determinism actually remains.


No, the problem is whether or not what appears indeterministic is a product of our limited perspective or the ontology of physics. 




> There are two perspectives to consider:


Wrong. The coin is large is enough and is moving through large enough space to be accurately predicted via GR (in fact, its probably large enough to be accurately predicted via Newtonian physics). If GR can accurately predict the accuracy of aluminum ion clocks, then it can easily accurately predict the results of a coin toss. The problem is not with the physical models but with engineering applications. Saying that GR/NP could predict a coin flip accurately is different than building a computer/robot capable of doing so, or even building a robot flipper capable of controlling all of the conditions to the exactitude of GR/NP. Also there would be the classic problem of induction, but thats another matter entirely. 




> Classical physics is over except as an approximation.


Classic physics is only an approximation down to a certain size, and then it doesnt give inaccurate results, it gives nonsensical (contradictory) results; thats a completely different thing. 




> You need to get a new map that fits the territory better.


MW is a map that fits just fine. 




> Are you claiming that because illusions exist then everything is an illusion? If so, that's a fallacy.


No, of course not. Im specifically saying that our ignorance of deterministic processes would create the illusion of free will. We can argue over whether or not there are deterministic processes, but that doesnt defeat the statement. 




> This is your extraordinary claim, not mine. You need to provide evidence that there is no possibility of free choice, none whatsoever, in spite of the evidence of QM, in spite of the evidence of our own experience. It is not enough to repeat metaphysical dogmas. Evidence is required.


You obviously arent keeping up with my claims. I have never claimed there is no possibility of free choice. Im saying there are two possibilities, one is that there is ontological free will and this is what we experience, and two that our ignorance of determinism creates the illusion of free-will. Further, Im arguing why the second option is more likely than the former option. I enumerated all of the reasons why. It seems the only one were really in disagreement about is whether there are deterministic processes or not. You say the evidence of QM contradicts this, but thats only if you assume the truth of CI, and Ive already pointed out the multitudinous problems of CI that youve yet to satisfactorily answer. In contrast, MW has one problem regarding it not (yet) being able to derive the Born probabilities. I claim this problem is much lesser than the problems facing CI. You seem to disagree, but have yet to argue why CIs problems are lesser. 




> You are the one claiming that my experience is an illusion. You need to provide evidence that you are right. So far, you have not provided any.


Im not claiming that. Im claiming its more likely thats the case, and I have provided evidence as to why. You just dont like the evidence. Further, you've given no evidence to prefer your explanation (ontological free-will) except "your experience," and I have given numerous examples of how our experiences are illusory, especially when it comes to physics. If anything, our senses have proved historically unreliable for accurately inferring statements about how physics works. In fact, why don't you provide an example of how our senses and metaphysical intuitions have ever been accurate with regards to how physics works. It was wrong about the flat Earth, it was wrong about geocentrism, it was wrong (or at best incomplete) with Newtonian physics, etc. All I see is a long history of wrong that was only corrected via the scientific method, not by a sensory experience translating to an accurate intuition about reality.

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## YesNo

> The interpretations avoid going down that path because how in the world would you move toward proving it or even arguing for it? We dont even fully understand how a brain/consciousness makes decisions, and we only know about it all because countless particles are making up the matter of a brain. How can a non-brain make a decision? How could you show that it did?


I think this issue of choice for the quantum stuff, say an electron declaring its position or momentum in an experiment, is the heart of the problem. There is nothing to distinguish this electron from another. There are no hidden variables, but still the electron gives different answers and they are not random answers. 

I don't think any of the interpretations want to claim that the electron is making a choice. I think that is what they want to avoid having to say. 

Regarding consciousness, one could define a basic consciousness as the ability to make a "choice". With that the electron becomes conscious, by definition, if it made a choice. Unless one can come up with a cause for the electron's "choice", it can be modeled as a "choice" implying it is conscious in some basic way. 

From here you get the varied interpretations which try to go to the measurement process itself to show that the electron did not actually make a choice. It doesn't matter whether the wave function collapsed or not. That is just different interpretations bickering among themselves. What matters is whether the electron made a choice.




> Of course, you may say that classical physics is an approximation because QM is more accurate, though this is debatable; GR has withstood every test weve thrown at it and so has QM,


Relativity has failed the non-locality test that Bell formulated and experimenters later verified. The reality of the universe is non-local, although communication is limited by the speed of light. 

These results about non-locality are not at the level of quantum theory nor any interpretation, but at the same level as the double-slit experiments. They are facts that can be used to falsify parts of a theory.




> Right, and how do you explain this? How do particles affect each other at great distances many times faster than the speed of light? Magic?


Non-locality is a quantum fact. 

I was recently reading Nick Herbert's Quantum Reality (1985). Although it is old, the exposition is good. He provided a summary of the non-locality issue. As I recall, he said that every interpretation has to include non-locality or it fails. He mentioned that MW fulfills this by the non-locality of creating many worlds instantaneously. 




> No, the problem is whether or not what appears indeterministic is a product of our limited perspective or the ontology of physics.


What I am trying to say, is the world could just as well appear deterministic because of our limited perspective, but not actually be so. What we see are trends not deterministic causes. This is where the idea of pseudo-determinism comes in. 





> Classic physics is only an approximation down to a certain size, and then it doesnt give inaccurate results, it gives nonsensical (contradictory) results; thats a completely different thing.


If something can be measured, it is not nonsensical. It might contradict our "map" or metaphysics. 




> You obviously arent keeping up with my claims. I have never claimed there is no possibility of free choice.


If that is what you are saying, then we are in agreement. There is a possibility of choice. 

Based on QM and my own experiences that possibility is close to 100%. I don't think we could function as we do without the ability to make some choices, however else we are constrained.




> Im saying there are two possibilities, one is that there is ontological free will and this is what we experience, and two that our ignorance of determinism creates the illusion of free-will. Further, Im arguing why the second option is more likely than the former option. I enumerated all of the reasons why. It seems the only one were really in disagreement about is whether there are deterministic processes or not. You say the evidence of QM contradicts this, but thats only if you assume the truth of CI, and Ive already pointed out the multitudinous problems of CI that youve yet to satisfactorily answer. In contrast, MW has one problem regarding it not (yet) being able to derive the Born probabilities. I claim this problem is much lesser than the problems facing CI. You seem to disagree, but have yet to argue why CIs problems are lesser.


Actually, I don't even understand CI well enough to say I agree with it or not. It seems to be the safest approach to take because it just deals with the facts.

Our ignorance of determinism or our ignorance of indeterminism makes no difference as to whether we are completely determined or not. It does not help us make a decision as to the facts of the matter and may very well get in the way of seeing the facts.




> Im not claiming that. Im claiming its more likely thats the case, and I have provided evidence as to why. You just dont like the evidence. Further, you've given no evidence to prefer your explanation (ontological free-will) except "your experience," and I have given numerous examples of how our experiences are illusory, especially when it comes to physics. If anything, our senses have proved historically unreliable for accurately inferring statements about how physics works. In fact, why don't you provide an example of how our senses and metaphysical intuitions have ever been accurate with regards to how physics works. It was wrong about the flat Earth, it was wrong about geocentrism, it was wrong (or at best incomplete) with Newtonian physics, etc. All I see is a long history of wrong that was only corrected via the scientific method, not by a sensory experience translating to an accurate intuition about reality.


I don't see the evidence. This is how I see the argument we are having about the possibility of humans making a choice.

Assume I am looking at a tree. That is my experience. The tree is there. You tell me, "No, the tree is not there. That is an illusion. You have had many illusions in the past, so this could be an illusion as well." 

I say, "Fine, I have had illusions in the past, but I change my mind given evidence. Give me evidence that this particular time it is also an illusion." 

At this point you repeat the argument about my having had illusions in the past as evidence that the tree is not there. You might even add, "There is a _possibility_ that this tree is an illusion like those in the past."

I respond, "Yes, I know. There is a possibility I could be wrong, but show me that this tree is an illusion."

You say, "It is even more likely that you are having an illusion than not."

I say, "Who cares? As far as illusion go, you are a human being as well and have had just as many illusions as I do. How can I trust that your claim is not also an illusion? That is why I need evidence."

That is where I see us at the moment. We are caught arguing over the _possibility_ of anyone making a choice, but I am not interested in possibilities. I want to know whether we can make any choice or not.

My conclusion is until I get evidence to the contrary that I am willing to accept, the tree is there. In the case of free will, we can make choices.

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## MorpheusSandman

> I think this issue of choice for the quantum stuff, say an electron declaring its position or momentum in an experiment, is the heart of the problem.


You did absolutely nothing to answer my questions. For this discussion, I taboo the word choice. You cannot say choice. What you have to do is break down the physical processes involved in choices (without ever using the word), show how we know what they are and how they work, and then show how a single particle can replicate those processes. GO. 




> Relativity has failed the non-locality test that Bell formulated and experimenters later verified.


No, not even close. Non-locality is only a quantum fact if you accept collapse/CI. Again, you cite a reference on MW thats almost two decades old. Please read something more recent. MW is local. 




> What I am trying to say, is the world could just as well appear deterministic because of our limited perspective, but not actually be so. What we see are trends not deterministic causes. This is where the idea of pseudo-determinism comes in.


Basically what youre talking about with trends not deterministic causes is Humes Problem of Induction which states we can never move from the consistency of past observances to absolute, eternal truth. Its a fair enough point, but then the whole argument becomes moot because youve disallowed for the possibility of anyone ever claiming anything is deterministic. Oh, sure, youve predicted the sun will rise in the East correctly every day for your entire life, but it may turn into a snow bunny tomorrow! Its entirely indeterministic! 




> If something can be measured, it is not nonsensical. It might contradict our "map" or metaphysics.


I dont really know what youre saying here if you apply GR to quantum phenomena, you get nonsense like infinities. See here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2mjoI7bgXM At roughly 6:50 they describe the attempts at unifying the two and how it breeds more of the same nonsensical results. This is what Ive been saying about having two theories that perfectly describe phenomena on two different levels and the inability for one to subsume the other. CI is complete, and that completeness seems to contradict another theory that works perfectly well on another scale; there is no reason why this should be, and certainly not one weve found in the past century of dealing with it. 

Your claims that QM is a more accurate model than GR is only correct if were talking about events at quantum levels, but this does not explain why GR is perfectly accurate at macro levels. If GR was just an approximation and QM was more accurate then the math for GR _should_ fit into the math for QM and not produce infinities. They should work together, because this is how approximations VS more accurate models work; its how GR VS Newton works, its how Darwin VS modern evolution works. You dont end up with two contradictory theories, you end up with one approximate theory that fits inside a more comprehensive theory. If GR was indeed wrong, then it should not work as well as it does. 

Really, the fact that MW is incomplete, that it cant derive the Born theories, really makes it much more open to being reconciled with GR completely, especially since it works on the same principles GR works on (locality, deterministic, real, etc.). 




> I don't think we could function as we do without the ability to make some choices, however else we are constrained.


You still havent argued what would make this any different from our ignorance of determinism leading to the feeling of having a choice. Why dont you think we could function as we do without ontological choices? 




> It seems to be the safest approach to take because it just deals with the facts.


All QM interpretations deal with the facts, the difference is in how they treat them. CI introduces a collapse that is not present in the math, it assumes one world, it assumes humans dont behave like particles, and you get all of the insolvable problems/paradoxes because of those assumptions. IMO, MW deals with the facts more concretely by simply assuming the wavefunction is real and extends to all levels and all things. Yes, by assuming this we cant derive Born, but we also eliminate the paradoxes, several additional assumptions, and leave open the possibility of reconciliation with a theory that works perfectly on non-quantum levels. 




> Our ignorance of determinism or our ignorance of indeterminism makes no difference as to whether we are completely determined or not.


No, youre right that theyre two separate issues, but the reason for bringing up ignorance of determinism producing illusion of choice is because you initially argued that our experiential feeling of choice was indeed evidence of actual choice. I argued that our ignorance of determinism would equally explain the feeling of choice and is quite consistent with what we know about the limitations of human cognition/knowledge. We are even ignorant of how our own brains work, yet people make all kinds of metaphysical assumptions about what their thoughts mean without investigating the thing that seems to produce those thoughts. 




> This is how I see the argument we are having about the possibility of humans making a choice.


I figured sooner or later youd make this argument, but its a fallacious one for an obvious reason: A sense experience leading to the question of objective existence is entirely different to a subjective experience leading to the question of an objective cause of that experience. Let me try to distinguish the difference: 

If you see a tree you are assuming that there is an external object producing that experience. You can help confirm it with other senses (touch, taste, smell), you can ask others to confirm it the same way, and, whats more, you can build up a whole network of causal entanglements by which to see if the tree is/isnt there under certain conditions (ie, blindness, lack of light, cutting it down, etc.) to see how the sense changes. So not only do you have the consistency of sight, you have the consistency of other senses, the confirmation of others, and more in-depth network including understanding how light interacts with eyes and brains. In every way we have available to us we can confirm the existence of the tree. 

Choice is not even remotely the same thing as the above. Firstly, there is no sense of anything external relating to choice. You dont see it, smell it, taste it, hear it, etc. you are merely feeling (ie, not sensing with your 5 senses) what is more than likely the physical processes of your brain. We know a great deal about how brain processes produces feelings, and we have no examples to contradict this (ie, that such feelings can be produced without a brain). 

However, youd claim that this feeling corresponds to an actual, ontological free will. IE, something else out there is producing this feeling and this feeling allows you to make an actual choice that is not determined by the physical make-up of your brain. These are all some bold assumptions, and I see absolutely no basis for assuming any of these things. In fact, there are many reasons to NOT assume these things, such as our history of imagining things that do not exist and then assuming they do merely because we were capable of thinking about them. Clearly, our ability to think something and feel that something is not good proof that there is something OUT THERE that exists that is causing that feeling/conception. 

Whats more, as it relates to the specific topic of physics, these feelings have never, ever been reliable as to accurately describing how reality functions. In fact, theyve been consistently wrong and have only been corrected via the scientific method, which exists in part to not let human biases and assumptions get in the way. So its the not the case with the tree where sensing tree = tree exists is an inference that is confirmed in every way possible, its more a case of feeling something subjectively = inferring something objective exists that is causing that feeling and that this assumption is true, and such inferences are NOT historically reliable. 

Finally, theres the argument that and ignorance of determinism would produce the same feeling without corresponding to actual free-will. The argument in favor of this is that we know we are ignorant aboutif you dont want to say deterministic processes, lets say physical processes. To go back to the case of the coin-flip, even if youd dispute GRs ability to predict the flip with 100% accuracy (though I see no reason to assume this given the deterministic nature of what GR is describing and its consistently proved accuracy in those contexts), you cant deny that if we could take those physical processes into account, the probabiliy of the flip would NOT be 50/50, but more like 99.99999/0.00001. So we know that our ignorance of physical processes produces what feels like uncertainty to us, so why would you assume that our ignorance of our cognitive processes would do any differently?

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## YesNo

> You did absolutely nothing to answer my questions. For this discussion, *I taboo the word “choice.”* You cannot say “choice.” What you have to do is break down the physical processes involved in choices (without ever using the word), show how we know what they are and how they work, and then show how a single particle can replicate those processes. GO.


I don't see how you can taboo discussion of choice. If that is what you want to do, that is your choice. I'll continue as I have.




> No, not even close. Non-locality is only a quantum fact if you accept collapse/CI. Again, you cite a reference on MW that’s almost two decades old. Please read something more recent. MW is local.


I think the only way MW could be consistently local is if it were completely deterministic. Otherwise it would need non-locality somewhere, because non-locality is a quantum fact. However I don't think that determinism is possible.




> Basically what you’re talking about with “trends not deterministic causes” is Hume’s Problem of Induction which states we can never move from the consistency of past observances to absolute, eternal truth. It’s a fair enough point, but then the whole argument becomes moot because you’ve disallowed for the possibility of anyone ever claiming anything is deterministic. “Oh, sure, you’ve predicted the sun will rise in the East correctly every day for your entire life, but it may turn into a snow bunny tomorrow! It’s entirely indeterministic!”


I don't think the issue of quantum uncertainty has anything to do with Hume's induction. What we have is evidence, through the double slit experiment, that the electron, or whatever quantum particle we are considering, appears to be making a choice. It is not a generalization, but a specific experiment that is causing the problem.

EDIT: On rethinking this part, Hume does seem to make it look as if one cannot logically argue that the world is deterministic. I think he is right about that, but that is not the point that quantum facts are making. They are making a stronger case that the world, in fact, is not deterministic, not simply that we cannot logically conclude that determinism is true.




> Really, the fact that MW is “incomplete,” that it can’t derive the Born theories, really makes it much more open to being reconciled with GR completely, especially since it works on the same principles GR works on (locality, deterministic, real, etc.).


That actually makes MW worth rejecting.




> You still haven’t argued what would make this any different from our ignorance of determinism leading to the feeling of having a choice. Why don’t you think we could function as we do without ontological choices?


It is no more useful arguing that than arguing how our ignorance of indeterminism can lead to a feeling, or rather a belief in this case, that we are determined. 

The reason I don't think we can function that way is because it would require chance to generate change. Chance doesn't generate change. With chance everything stays the way it always has. 




> No, you’re right that they’re two separate issues, but the reason for bringing up “ignorance of determinism producing illusion of choice” is because you initially argued that our experiential feeling of choice was indeed evidence of actual choice. I argued that our ignorance of determinism would equally explain the feeling of choice and is quite consistent with what we know about the limitations of human cognition/knowledge.


The basic difference is I value my experience over another person's metaphysics. My experience is evidence. Your theory is metaphysics. As far as I'm concerned belief in MW is like believing in the tooth fairy. Neither of them exists. So if you want to counter my experience, it better be with evidence that is extraordinary and adequate to convince me.

The phrase "ignorance of determinism" assumes a metaphysics that "determinism" is true. I don't accept that metaphysics, so you will have to come up with some other argument.




> I figured sooner or later you’d make this argument, but it’s a fallacious one for an obvious reason: A sense experience leading to the question of objective existence is entirely different to a subjective experience leading to the question of an objective cause of that experience. Let me try to distinguish the difference: 
> 
> If you see a tree you are assuming that there is an external object producing that experience. You can help confirm it with other senses (touch, taste, smell), you can ask others to confirm it the same way, and, what’s more, you can build up a whole network of causal entanglements by which to see if the tree is/isn’t there under certain conditions (ie, blindness, lack of light, cutting it down, etc.) to see how the sense changes. So not only do you have the consistency of sight, you have the consistency of other senses, the confirmation of others, and more in-depth network including understanding how light interacts with eyes and brains. In every way we have available to us we can confirm the existence of the tree.



If I understand this, you don't accept my tree analogy because one can actually see and verify the tree exists. That is precisely why I used it. I will admit that I can't see my ability to make a choice like I can see a tree. But neither can I see those "many worlds" you would like me to believe in. 

If you don't need to provide evidence for MW, why should anyone provide evidence for anything? If MW can survive with the hand-waving of not generating the Born rule, why should anyone care what anyone believes about anything? Just like with MW, they can laugh off any criticism of their theory and say that their theory is still "incomplete" (while I laugh their theory into the garbage can).

This is why we need _evidence_, not repeating metaphysical dogmas.

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## MorpheusSandman

> I don't see how you can taboo discussion of choice.


What I meant is this: http://lesswrong.com/lw/nu/taboo_your_words/ I'm not tabooing the _discussion_ of choice, I'm tabooing the word itself. 




> However I don't think that determinism is possible.


If there is no wavefunction collapse and its QM all the way down, then QM _would_ be deterministic. The only thing that makes it indeterministic is assuming first that theres a collapse and second that humans are not in a state of superposition like particles and third that there is some split between quantum and classic worlds. Its those assumptions that create indeterminism. Take them away and you get determinism. 




> I don't think the issue of quantum uncertainty has anything to do with Hume's induction.


When you said: What we see are trends not deterministic causes. it sounded like you were talking about Humes problem of induction, meaning that no matter how consistently we observe something its merely a trend and not proof of determinism. You keep bringing up the double-slit experiment, but why is it more logical to state that the electron chooses to go through one slit or the other as opposed to saying it goes through both and we only see it go through one because we are in the same state of superposition as the particle? 




> That actually makes MW worth rejecting.


WTF!? Why? 




> Chance doesn't generate change. With chance everything stays the way it always has.


Evolution says differently. 




> The basic difference is I value my experience over another person's metaphysics.


The issue is not your experience. Its like I said in another thread about NDEs, nobody is questioning the experience, were questioning the logical inferences and conclusions being drawn from the experience. Humans are not innately good at making such inferences. One only has to investigate the history of proposed causes behind phenomena to realize this. Weve been wrong _far_ more often than weve been right, and so often the only reason we found the right answer is by removing human bias as much as possible and questioning the hidden assumptions we were making about reality via the scientific method. 

So, to repeat, Im not questioning your experience of, eg, choice, Im questioning your inferences and conclusion that the choice is REAL as opposed to a feeling generated by the limitations in your awareness of your own cognitive processes. My theory is not what Id call metaphysics, its proposing an alternate hypothesis that would explain a phenomena, the same way a spherical earth and gravity would explain the experience of standing on a flat earth just as well as a flat earth would. 




> As far as I'm concerned belief in MW is like believing in the tooth fairy.


Yes, because great minds like Feynman, Deutsch, Tegmark, Hawking, Gell-Mann, and Weinberg believe in something thats no different than tooth fairies.  :Rolleyes:  Its comments like this that make me think you are so innately biased against MW that theres absolutely nothing nobody can say or write that would convince you. Your metaphysics is so set against them that you have completely closed your mind to all evidence and arguments. 




> The phrase "ignorance of determinism" assumes a metaphysics that "determinism" is true. I don't accept that metaphysics,


No, it doesnt assume that determinism is true. You really need to look up Bayes Theorem, which teaches you how to deal with how conditional evidence affects the probabilities of prior propositions. In Bayes Theorem, you dont say given E(vidence), how likely is P(roposition)? but rather given P(roposition), how likely is E(evidence)? and then you balance that against given P isnt true, how likely is E? Under that theory you have to both assume that a proposition is and isnt true and then consider how the evidence affects both. 

So the point Im making is along the lines of Bayes, where I say assuming determinism is true, how likely is our feeling of choice? and Im saying that its just as likely as saying assuming indeterminism is true, how likely is our feeling of choice?. I think both of those statements are equally likely and you cant privilege one over the other. If you cant privilege one over the other, than your feeling of choice is no better evidence for determinism than indeterminism, you have to argue for indeterminism from some other source. 




> If I understand this, you don't accept my tree analogy because one can actually see and verify the tree exists. That is precisely why I used it. I will admit that I can't see my ability to make a choice like I can see a tree. But neither can I see those "many worlds" you would like me to believe in.


I think you understand the basics of my explanation, but its a bit more complicated than just seeing or not seeing. What I tried to do was show how you could build up a complex network of causal entanglement around the tree, your senses, others senses, and even physics like how photons, eyes, and brains work. In comparison, this causal complex is completely absent in the notion of choice because you dont even know what goes on in your brain when making a choice. You just lump a feeling under one umbrella label and dont investigate it any further. 

As Ive already explained, you dont need to see the many worlds because the many worlds themselves are a consequence of believing the wavefunction is a real thing, it doesnt collapse because QM works all the way down, and humans behave like aggregates of particles like everything else. If you believe those things, you get the many worlds even though you cant see them and, indeed, MW explains why you cant see them. 

The problem is that different propositions require different kinds of evidence. You cant pretend like theyre all equal. 




> If you don't need to provide evidence for MW, why should anyone provide evidence for anything? If MW can survive with the hand-waving of not generating the Born rule, why should anyone care what anyone believes about anything?


But I HAVE provided evidence for MW! To recap: 

1. MWs first basic claim is that QM works all the way down, which would mean everything is in a state of superposition. So far, this has been confirmed by every test done on molecules with 2424 particles. There is no evidence for a collapse that separates the quantum and classic worlds. 

2. MWs second basic claim is that the wavefunction is real, which would mean that we should be able to use it to make the exact kind of predictions were able to make. 

3. MW is compatible with everything we know about classic physics, the same classic physics that have been consistently accurate in modeling large objects in spacetime. The only exception is gravity; however, in being deterministic, local, and real, MW is at least capable of being reconciled with gravity as we learn more. 

4. MW being compatible with classic physics would follow the pattern of a more comprehensive theory subsuming an approximate theory, the same way GR did with Newtonian Physics and modern evolution did with Darwinian evolution. 

Compare with CI: 

1. CI claims that there is a collapse and that this collapse separates the indeterministic world of QM with the deterministic world of GR. So far, this collapse/split has NOT been found in any tests that have been done, and it is certainly not required in any of the mathematical formulas. 

2. CI treats the wavefunction as non-real, and if its non-real then we shouldnt be able to make the predictions that we do. 

3. CI is incompatible with everything we know about classic physics. 

4. CI being incompatible with classic physics would be the first time in the history of science that a new theory completely contradicted a previous, merely approximate theory. Whats more, it would be the first time that we found that things work differently at different levels, despite the fact that classical physics works exactly like wed expect if it was QM all the way down. 

The ONLY advantage CI has is that it can derive the Born rule, but it does this by assuming things that is has absolutely no reason/evidence for assuming. Its not all that different than assuming the existence of God to explain lightning before we knew about meteorology and electricity. Sure, it explains lightning, but theres no reason for assuming its true. Whats more, theres no reason to assume that MW cant derive the Born rule as technology, especially quantum computing, advances.

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## YesNo

> What I meant is this: http://lesswrong.com/lw/nu/taboo_your_words/ I'm not tabooing the _discussion_ of choice, I'm tabooing the word itself.


I don't have time to respond to everything, but here are some quick comments.

I see now that you are playing a game called "taboo" which I was unaware of. My use of the word "choice" was to play a similar game. I was trying to "taboo" the notion of "wave function collapse". It doesn't seem fruitful to use this any more since it is unclear what it means. 

Yudkowski wrote the following in the link you cited.

The illusion of unity across religions can be dispelled by making the term "God" taboo, and asking them to say what it is they believe in...
I think the use of the word "God" should also be restricted to something else. I am more inclined to be interested in someone's view of the universe than their view of God.




> If there is no wavefunction collapse and it’s QM all the way down, then QM _would_ be deterministic. The only thing that makes it indeterministic is assuming first that there’s a collapse and second that humans are not in a state of superposition like particles and third that there is some split between quantum and classic worlds. It’s those assumptions that create indeterminism. Take them away and you get determinism.


I think you are caught in a misconception here about wave function collapse. The world is not divided between the indeterministic quantum world and the deterministic world after some sort of collapse. The whole world allows for indeterminism, however, to do that for various organisms one needs some stability which comes from a pseudo-determinism. 

As far as I'm concerned, I've "tabooed" the phrase "wave function collapse".




> When you said: “What we see are trends not deterministic causes.” it sounded like you were talking about Hume’s problem of induction, meaning that no matter how consistently we observe something it’s merely a trend and not proof of determinism. You keep bringing up the double-slit experiment, but why is it more logical to state that the electron “chooses” to go through one slit or the other as opposed to saying it goes through both and we only see it go through one because we are in the same state of superposition as the particle?


If we don't have some stability, which determinism would provide, we could not make any interesting choices. If we have determinism we can't make _any_ choices. That is where the idea of "trending" comes in and I got it from Sheldrake. 

Regarding the electron we have to be careful not to assume we know what it does. I don't think it is accurate to say that it goes through all paths (as Feynman claim) although that would allow one to make perhaps easier calculations of the probabilities. This is why I like CI. It keeps the problem in the forefront rather than trying to resolve it too quickly. It doesn't appear that the electron exists as either a particle or a field. So jumping to a metaphor of either particle or wave boxes our understanding.




> WTF!? Why?


The question is why I think one should reject MW because it fails to come up with the Born rule. The reason is because we are talking about quantum facts which are not intuitive. We need to not add on intuitive assumptions about reality, because they get in the way of understanding those facts. The problem is not to come up with a solution that fits past science. That science is over except where it has been shown to be technologically useful.




> Evolution says differently.


I don't think so. Chance is used as a solution of last resort far too often in science. If reality is deterministic, there is no chance involved. If reality is not deterministic one needs to consider "choice" and "purpose" rather than chance as explanations.

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